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ESTABLISHING GUIDELINES FOR ATTORNEY 
REPRESENTATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AT 
THE SENTENCING PHASE OF CAPITAL TRIALS 
Adam Lamparello* 
“People who are well represented at trial do not get the death penalty . . .  
I have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming to the Supreme  
Court on eve-of-execution stay applications in which the defendant was  
well represented at trial.” 
  —Justice Ginsburg1 
 
“After 20 years on (the) high court, I have to acknowledge that serious  
questions are being raised about whether the death penalty is being  
fairly administered in this country. Perhaps it’s time to look at minimum  
standards for appointed counsel in death cases and adequate  
compensation for appointed counsel when they are used.” 
  —Justice O’Connor 2 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Strickland v. Washington,3 the United States Supreme Court issued a 
seminal holding that single-handedly rendered it nearly impossible for a capital 
defendant to demonstrate that he was the victim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
at the underlying trial or at sentencing.  Specifically, and as discussed in more 
detail below, the Court held that, in order to prove that counsel’s performance was 
ineffective, the defendant was required to demonstrate that counsel’s efforts fell 
below an objective standard of “reasonableness,” and that such performance was 
“prejudicial,” in that the alleged errors undermined confidence in the trial’s 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law & Westerfield Fellow, Loyola College of Law, New Orleans. LL.M, 
New York University, 2006; J.D., Ohio State University, 2001; B.A., University of Southern California, 
1997. I would like to thank my research assistant, Cosima Clements, for her tireless efforts during the 
research phase of this article and, in particular, for providing invaluable feedback throughout the 
drafting and revision process. 
 1. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, (April 10, 2001), available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-representation (emphasis added). 
 2. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, (April 10, 2001), available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-representation (emphasis added). 
 3. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  In Strickland, the defendant pleaded guilty to three murder charges and, 
during the plea colloquy, explained to the court that “although he had committed a string of burglaries, 
he had no significant prior criminal record and that at the time of his criminal spree he was under 
extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family.” Id. at 668.  In preparation for the 
sentencing hearing, defendant’s counsel did not present any mitigating evidence whatsoever regarding 
defendant’s background, character, or emotional state, and did not conduct any in-depth investigations 
into any of these areas. Instead, counsel simply relied upon the colloquy for evidence regarding these 
matters. The defendant ultimately was sentenced to death and thus sought collateral relief, alleging that 
counsel’s failure to investigate and present character witnesses on defendant’s behalf constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. 
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outcome.4 In rendering it exceedingly difficult for defendants to succeed on 
ineffective assistance claims, the Court repeatedly emphasized that “[j]udicial 
scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential”5 and that “a court 
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance.”6 In this way, the Court strived to 
make it difficult for defendants to succeed on ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, explaining to lower courts that they “should recognize that counsel is 
strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance”7 and “strategic choices 
made after thorough investigation of law and facts . . .  are virtually 
unchallengeable.”8 
Indeed, due in substantial part to the fact that “Strickland was not intended to 
impose rigorous standards on criminal defense attorneys,”9 the Court found 
ineffective assistance of counsel in only one case over the next sixteen years.10 
Critically, however, during this time, both state and federal courts bore witness to 
some of the most horrific examples of death penalty representation in the history of 
criminal jurisprudence.  As set forth below, empirical data uncovered that many 
attorneys representing capital defendants were under the influence of alcohol, 
                                                                                                     
 4. Id. at 687. 
 5. Id. at 689. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 690. 
 8. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
 9. Craig M. Cooley, Mapping the Monster’s Mental Health and Social History:  Why Capital 
Defense Attorneys and Public Defender Death Penalty Units Require the Services of Mitigation 
Specialists, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 23, 76 (2005) (quoting Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of 
Counsel in Capital Cases: the Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 333).  See also 
Kelly Reissmann, Note, “Our System is Broken”: A Study of the Crisis Facing the Death-Eligible 
Defendant, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 43, 47-48 (2002). In describing the difficulty of demonstrating that 
counsel’s performance at trial was ineffective, the Author writes: 
The Strickland standard for ineffective counsel is almost impossible to meet. The 
burden rests with the defendant to satisfy both prongs of the test to prove that his or her 
counsel was ineffective. Showing that counsel’s performance was deficient . . . may not 
cause much difficulty. The prejudice requirement, however, poses great difficulty for 
defendants asserting a claim of ineffective assistance. The prejudice requirement 
mandates a showing that trial counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, and to undermine confidence in the result of the trial. Clearly, 
the prejudice prong is the most difficult element of the test to meet, especially in light of 
the extreme deference to counsel. 
Id. at 47. 
 10. Cooley, supra note 9, at 79.  See also John H. Blume & Stacy Neumann, “It’s Like Déjà Vu All 
Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard, and a (Partial) Return to the 
Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel,  34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 134 (2007); 
Kenneth Williams, Ensuring the Capital Defendant’s Right to Competent Counsel: It’s Time for Some 
Standards!  51 WAYNE L. REV. 129, 139 (2005).  Williams explains: 
Strickland has proven to be inadequate in protecting a capital defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. . . .  [I]t is almost as difficult to 
prove ineffectiveness now as it was prior to Strickland. Courts have been unwilling to 
find that an attorney’s performance was deficient even in the most egregious cases or 
they have often held that the defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s representation. 
Id.  
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drugs, or both during critical aspects of the trial.11 In addition, many lawyers 
literally fell asleep during presentation of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, while 
others suffered from mental illnesses that affected both their preparedness and 
competence.12 Furthermore, “several recent studies of capital trials reveal that 
lawyers who represented death row inmates at trial were subsequently disbarred, 
suspended, or otherwise disciplined at a rate three to forty-six times the average for 
the relevant states.”13 Stated simply, “[T]he utter inadequacy of trial and appellate 
lawyers for capital defendants has been widely recognized as the single most 
spectacular failure in the administration of capital punishment.”14 
The reason for this failure is neither mysterious nor elusive.  Quite frankly, 
“[T]he Court’s terse and contradictory reasoning [in Strickland] has led to the 
miserable quality of capital defense advocacy.”15 As discussed above, the 
“Strickland standard proved virtually impossible to meet . . . [because] [a]lmost all 
representation was found to be within Strickland’s ‘wide range of professionally 
competent assistance.’”16 Moreover, even where a defendant could demonstrate 
that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 
the appeal nonetheless nearly always failed because such defendant could not 
satisfy the prejudice prong, namely, showing that such representation affected the 
outcome of the trial.17 More specifically, when discerning whether unreasonable 
attorney performance prejudiced a defendant, “courts often deferred to 
incomprehensible ‘strategic’ decisions provided by trial counsel rationalizing their 
                                                                                                     
 11. Galia Benson-Amram, Protecting the Integrity of the Court: Trial Court Responsibility for 
Preventing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
425, 432 (2004). 
 12. Id. See also Matthew J. Fogelman, Justice Asleep Is Justice Denied: Why Dozing Defense 
Attorneys Demean the Sixth Amendment and Should Be Deemed Per Se Prejudicial, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 
67 (2002). 
 13. Benson-Amram, supra note 11, at 432. 
 14. See Cooley, supra note 9, at 65 (quoting Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1923, 1923 (1994)). 
 15. Id. at 79. See also Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of INeffective Assistance of Counsel, 
58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1477-78 (1999) (discussing glaring examples of incompetent representation that 
were deemed “effective” under Strickland). In criticizing the Court’s decision in Strickland, Klein 
states: 
In Strickland, the Supreme Court was confronted for the first time with the task of 
determining the standard to be used for assessing the effectiveness of counsel in a 
criminal case. The Court had the opportunity to render an opinion that could have 
benefitted untold numbers of indigents represented by court appointed private attorneys 
or public defenders. The competency of defense counsel had long been of concern and 
the Court’s decision was eagerly awaited by those associations of attorneys most 
involved with providing and assessing defense services. . . . [Unfortunately, t]he 
Strickland Court’s clear diminution of the import of effective counsel . . . has lead to a 
situation in the state and federal courts of this country wherein defense counsel are 
routinely denied the time and resources with which to challenge the prosecutor’s case . . 
. . The Court has reduced the Sixth Amendment to one of form over substance. 
Id. 
 16. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 142 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 
 17. See id. at 142.  See also George C. Thomas, III, History’s Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004 
U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 551 (“[T]o require prejudice in the right to counsel context is essentially to say to a 
defendant that the right to a competent lawyer exists only when the state’s case is weak.”). 
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slothful representation.”18 Ultimately, the problem with Strickland is that the 
standard “is a very low one”19 that has been “criticized for fostering tolerance of 
abysmal lawyering”20 such that, in the sixteen years following its decision, “the 
Court found ineffectiveness in only one capital case.”21 Critics have gone so far as 
to characterize Strickland’s two-pronged standard as “an essentially meaningless 
test.”22 Perhaps the reason for this lies in the Court’s own words regarding the 
Sixth Amendment, namely, that it is “not to improve the quality of legal 
representation”23 nor determine “what conduct is ‘prudent or appropriate, but only 
what is constitutionally compelled.’”24 
Importantly, however, perhaps the most significant factor contributing to the 
incompetent state of representation in capital trials arises from the lack of any 
meaningful standards by which to govern the performance of attorneys in capital 
trials.25 The absence of standards is deleterious particularly in capital cases because 
the “unique, bifurcated nature of capital trials and the special investigation into the 
defendant’s personal history and background . . . [along with] the complexity and 
fluidity of the law, and the high emotional stakes involved all make capital cases 
more costly and difficult to litigate than ordinary criminal trials.”26  Due to the lack 
of standards governing either the appointment or performance of counsel, 
defendants have often been represented by “an appointed lawyer [who] was 
completely unqualified to handle a capital case,”27 counsel who was “unaware of 
the governing death penalty statute,”28 a lawyer who “was not even aware that a 
                                                                                                     
 18. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 142. 
 19. Cooley, supra note 9, at 76.  
 20. Id. at 77 (quoting William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn:  Doctrinal and 
Practical Understanding of the Right of Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 94 (1995)). 
 21. Id. at 79. 
 22. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 134.  See also Donald J. Hall, Effectiveness of Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 225, 225 (quoting a report by the Constitution Project, which 
stated that “[t]he current Supreme Court standard for effective assistance of counsel . . . permits 
‘effective but fatal counsel’ and requires the defendant to show both that counsel’s performance was 
deficient and that the deficient performance undermined the reliability of the conviction or sentence.”). 
 23. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 24. Cooley, supra note 9, at 79 (quoting Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 246 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
 25. See id. at 67-68.  See also Kenneth Williams, Why It Is So Difficult to Prove Innocence in 
Capital Cases, 42 TULSA L. REV. 241, 245-46 (2006). Williams explains: 
The only specific standard the Court has established is to require counsel to conduct an 
investigation if one is warranted under the circumstances. Other than that, the Court has 
refused to establish any new standards that counsel must meet, even in capital cases. 
Because the test the Court has adopted is so malleable, counsel’s performance is able to 
pass muster in most instances and most claims of ineffective assistance are not 
successful. 
Id. 
 26. Cooley, supra note 9, at 67-68 (quoting McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1257 (1994) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting on denial of writ of certiorari)). See generally Michael D. Moore, Note, 
Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: An Examination and Analysis of State Indigent Defense Systems 
and Their Application to Death-Eligible Defendants, 37 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1617 (1996) (arguing 
that the system of representation for indigent capital defendants is deeply flawed and systemic reforms 
are necessary to provide competent counsel in the form of capital trial units who meet specific 
qualifications). 
 27. Benson-Amram, supra note 11, at 433. 
 28. Id. 
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separate sentencing proceeding would be held in a capital case,”29 and lawyers 
who, quite simply, “[did] not know how to proceed.”30 Consequently, the 
combination of Strickland’s deferential criteria and the lack of meaningful 
standards to guide attorney performance have been the driving forces underlying 
the “horrendous problems confronted by capital defendants in securing adequate 
representation.”31  
Ultimately, therefore, “capital defendants are typically represented by the 
worst of the worst.”32 Based upon empirical studies, “[a]pproximately ninety 
percent of capital defendants are indigent” and thus represented by court-appointed 
attorneys.33 Moreover, in certain states, “three-quarters of those convicted of 
capital murder while represented by court-appointed lawyers have been sentenced 
to death.”34 In Kentucky alone, nearly a quarter of death-row inmates were 
represented by attorneys who were later disbarred or had their licenses suspended.35 
In Alabama, court-appointed attorneys representing capital defendants were subject 
to disciplinary action, including disbarment, at a rate twenty times higher than that 
of the bar as a whole, and “[f]or those attorneys whose clients were executed, the 
rate of disciplinary sanctions was almost forty times that of the bar as a whole.”36 
The conclusion is ineluctable—the paradigm of capital representation is broken and 
requires systemic change.  More specifically, the breakdown in the representation 
of capital defendants can be traced both to Strickland’s highly deferential standard 
and the fact that there are no specific standards that govern the performance of 
attorneys representing capital defendants.  
Consequently, this Article will attempt to remedy the problem of ineffective 
assistance of counsel by proposing sweeping changes to:  (1) the manner in which 
capital defendants are represented; and (2) the method by which their cases are 
reviewed on appeal.  As an initial matter, this Article will focus exclusively on the 
sentencing phase of the capital trial because “many capital defendants get no 
meaningful support at the sentencing phase [and]  . . . for this reason, claims of  . . . 
ineffectiveness at the penalty phase are among the most common issues raised . . . 
by inmates on death row.”37 As stated by one Commentator, “[C]ertain specific 
duties, such as the duty to investigate [for mitigating evidence] . . . [have] become 
                                                                                                     
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 434. 
 31. Cooley, supra note 9, at 66 (quoting Norman Lefstein, Reform of Defense Representation in 
Capital Cases: The Indiana Experience and its Implications for the Nation, 29 IND. L. REV. 495, 497 
(1996)).  See also Geimer, supra note 20, at 96-97; Talia Nye-Keif, Comment, “Capital” Punishment or 
“Lack-of-Capital” Punishment? Indigent Death Penalty Defendants Are Penalized by a Procedurally 
Flawed Counsel Appointment Process, 10 SCHOLAR 211, 212 (2008) (“Far too often, indigent death-
penalty defendants are appointed ineffective, inexperienced, or inexcusably incompetent counsel whose 
best efforts fail both their clients and the entire justice system.”). 
 32. Cooley, supra note 9, at 66. 
 33. Jeffrey Levinson, Don’t Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective Assistance 
of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 149 (2001). 
 34. Benson-Amram, supra note 11, at 431. 
 35. Id. at 432-33. 
 36. Id. at 433. 
 37. Cooley, supra note 9, at 24 (quoting Ira Mickenburg, Ineffective Counsel, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 4, 
2003, at S9). 
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the most heavily scrutinized aspect of defense counsel’s representation.”38 In so 
doing, this Article will posit that there should exist, in each state, a Death Penalty 
Representation Commission that promulgates detailed guidelines that require each 
attorney to undertake specific steps to uncover mitigating evidence from various 
aspects of a defendant’s background that may be relevant to the issue of culpability. 
These will include, but are not limited to, medical, social, psychological, 
psychiatric, educational, familial, and criminal histories.  
In addition, as detailed below, defense counsel will be required, outside the 
presence of the jury, to certify to the trial court that each of these steps have been 
taken and explain in depth how such evidence is likely to be presented to the jury at 
the penalty phase. Furthermore, if defense counsel believes that, as a strategic 
matter, the investigation into or use of certain mitigating evidence is neither 
advantageous nor beneficial, then counsel must certify in writing to the trial court 
his specific reasons for so deciding. The purpose of these specific guidelines and 
explanatory requirements is to ensure both that the quality of representation at the 
trial level is increased substantially and that the record is enhanced sufficiently to 
ensure meaningful and adequate appellate review in the event of an ineffective 
assistance claim. 
The performance of these functions also contemplates a more active trial court 
in ensuring that counsel properly discharges his duty to engage in effective 
representation and meaningfully advocate on his client’s behalf. Specifically, 
should the trial court find defense counsel’s investigative efforts insufficient or 
non-exhaustive, it will have the authority to order further corrective efforts aimed 
at uncovering mitigating evidence that may bear directly upon the issue of the 
defendant’s culpability.  In addition, the trial court will also have oversight 
responsibilities relating to the manner in which defense counsel proffers mitigating 
evidence to the jury, for the purpose of ensuring that counsel’s representation is 
consistent with prevailing professional norms.  In this way, the problem of 
ineffective assistance of counsel can be addressed as it is happening, rather than 
after a defendant has been convicted and sentenced to death, where the record is 
often devoid of counsel’s omissions and hindsight’s benefits prove unavailing.  
Ultimately, at the conclusion of trial, should the court determine that counsel’s 
performance is objectively reasonable under the circumstances, then it shall issue 
an opinion explaining such a decision with specificity, and with reference to the 
law and facts upon which it is based.  
In addition, for purposes of appellate review, this Article proposes that the 
prejudice prong of Strickland be eliminated, in favor of a single inquiry into 
whether counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable under the 
circumstances. This determination would involve a presumption and burden-
shifting mechanism relating directly to the trial court’s decision regarding the 
competence of counsel’s performance (as well as counsel’s actual performance) 
during the sentencing phase. Specifically, the appellate court shall be responsible 
for reviewing the trial court’s holding that counsel’s performance was in 
compliance with both the relevant guidelines and standards of professional 
competence. If, after reviewing the record of counsel’s performance during the 
                                                                                                     
 38. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 132. 
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sentencing phase, the appellate court believes that the trial court’s holding was 
consistent with the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of 
counsel, then this shall create a presumption that counsel’s performance was 
objectively reasonable as a matter of law. The defendant would therefore be 
responsible for rebutting this presumption by adducing specific evidence 
demonstrating counsel’s ineffectiveness.  
Importantly, however, if the appellate court finds that the trial court’s decision 
was erroneous, and that counsel’s representation was constitutionally defective, 
then this shall create a presumption that, in fact, the defendant suffered a Sixth 
Amendment violation, and the state will then be required to proffer evidence 
supporting a determination that counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable. 
In making these determinations, the appellate court shall state the reasons for its 
decisions with specificity for the purpose of guiding the decisions of future courts, 
the conduct of attorneys in future cases, and providing the respective state 
commissions with information upon which its guidelines can be revised.39 
This Article next discusses the Strickland decision, particularly its rejection of 
specific standards to guide the performance of attorneys in capital cases.  Next, it 
details the state of death penalty jurisprudence that resulted both from Strickland’s 
nearly impenetrable standard and the lack of any meaningful criteria to guide 
attorney performance in capital cases, particularly at the sentencing phase.  Next, 
this Article proposes a new solution by which to enhance the quality of attorney 
performance in capital cases through the development of specific, meaningful, and 
relevant standards that would guide counsel’s representation at the sentencing 
stage. Importantly, this Article focuses on the sentencing phase because so many 
ineffective assistance claims focus upon counsels’ errors and omissions during 
sentencing.  
                                                                                                     
 39. Importantly, at least some commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), Rompilla 
v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005), signal a “jurisprudential shift” from the Court’s nearly impenetrable 
Strickland standard. Indeed, this view is informed by the fact that, in these three cases, the Court relied 
upon the ABA guidelines for attorney representation in finding that the defendants’ trial counsel had 
been ineffective.  Critically, however, a closer analysis of these cases reveals that the Court not only re-
affirmed Strickland, but also specifically rejected a guideline or checklist approach to assessing 
ineffective assistance claims, and continued to emphasize the need to afford substantial deference to trial 
counsel’s strategic decisions. In addition, a review of state and federal decisions after Williams, Wiggins, 
and Rompilla reveals that courts continue to be hostile to ineffective assistance claims, and allow 
terribly incompetent representation, particularly when a defendant’s life is at stake. Stated simply, 
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla did not import systemic change to the Court’s Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence, and are more notable for the facts upon which the Court granted relief rather than the law 
that it applied.  However, systemic change is exactly what is needed in order to prevent the grave abuses 
that defendants are suffering at the hands of incompetent attorneys and trial courts that continue to deny 
ineffective assistance petitions that allege incompetence that is truly startling.  Blume & Neumann, 
supra note 10, at 131-32. This Article proposes precisely that systemic change. 
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II.  STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON EXPRESSLY REJECTS THE CREATION OF STANDARDS 
TO GUIDE ATTORNEY PERFORMANCE IN CAPITAL CASES, AND INSTEAD RENDERS IT 
NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR DEFENDANTS TO SUCCEED IN DEMONSTRATING 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL  
A. The Initial Move to a  Guideline-Centered System of Representation 
This Article does not represent the first time that specific, categorical 
guidelines have been proposed to guide the performance of attorneys in capital 
cases. Nearly four decades ago, the American Bar Association (ABA) created the 
“Special Committee on Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice,” 
which was designed to promulgate standards governing, inter alia, the performance 
of defense counsel.40 In fact, one Commentator described this endeavor as follows: 
These committees created a tentative draft in March of 1970 which included 
standards for defense counsel. Although these standards were arguably general and 
non-specific, when viewed in conjunction with the commentary, the standards 
acted as guides for defense attorneys, establishing some minimum requirements of 
competency. The new standards placed a heavy focus on certain specific duties, 
such as the duty to investigate, which . . . would become the most heavily 
scrutinized aspect of defense counsel’s representation.41 
Critically, the new ABA Guidelines were responsive to the perception that “a 
rigorous legal standard was needed in order to increase the quality of criminal 
defense representation . . . particularly in cases involving court appointed counsel 
for indigent clients.”42 
Additionally, the notion that specific guidelines should be developed to guide 
counsel’s performance was bolstered when Chief Judge David Bazelon of the 
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia “announced a 
standard for evaluating counsel’s performance that offered real guidance to lawyers 
and judges.”43 These criteria elaborated upon specific standards that were already 
developed in Coles v. Peyton, a Fourth Circuit decision, where that court similarly 
                                                                                                     
 40. Id. at 132 (citing to ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION (Tentative Draft March 1970)).  
 41. Id.  Importantly, Blume and Neumann describe the debate existing at that time regarding the 
appropriate criteria that should govern the performance of defense counsel: 
The new ABA Guidelines fueled scholarly and judicial debate regarding the appropriate 
standard courts should use to resolve ineffective assistance of counsel claims. One camp 
believed the law should not simply be concerned with a particularly poorly represented 
defendant. Rather, a rigorous legal standard was needed in order to increase the quality 
of criminal defense representation across the board, particularly in cases involving court 
appointed counsel for indigent clients.  Statistics of unmanageable caseloads combined 
with inadequate funds had surfaced, and many practitioners and scholars, including 
defense attorneys themselves, had visions of mandatory funding and maximum caseload 
limits that would surely follow a constitutional standard on effectiveness that had some 
teeth. Others, however, believed courts should only be concerned with the reliability of 
the verdict in the case under review. 
Id. at 132-33. 
 42. Id. at 132. 
 43. Id. at 133. 
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endorsed the use of specific standards to guide attorney representation.44 
Specifically, Judge Bazelon “advocated a categorical or guideline approach that 
enumerated specific duties counsel must perform,”45 which ultimately amounted to 
a “check-list”46 of responsibilities that would ensure the effectiveness of counsel’s 
representation.47 Indeed, Judge Bazelon’s guideline approach “is premised on the 
belief that certain fundamental and specific tasks and duties must be performed in 
all criminal cases.”48 As a result, Judge Bazelon sought to effectuate accountability 
in defense representation through the creation of a “common set of standards that 
comprise these necessary functions and considers whether counsel substantially 
failed in any of the designated areas.”49 
In further underscoring the accountability that these guidelines would produce, 
both Judge Bazelon and the Fourth Circuit “concluded that an attorney’s ‘omission 
or failure to abide by these [duties] constitutes a denial of effective [assistance] of 
counsel,’ and the burden shifts to the government to establish a lack of 
prejudice.”50 As Judge Bazelon held, “If a defendant shows a substantial violation 
of any of these requirements he has been denied effective representation unless the 
government, ‘on which is cast the burden of proof once a violation of these 
precepts is shown, can establish lack of prejudice thereby.’”51 Importantly, Judge 
Bazelon’s burden-shifting provision was predicated upon the fact that “proof of 
                                                                                                     
 44. 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968). 
 45. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 133.  See United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster I), 487 
F.2d 1197, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev’d on rehearing en banc, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  In 
discussing counsel’s performance with respect to ineffective assistance claims, Judge Bazelon 
enunciated the following specific standards: 
Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly. Counsel should be 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare to defend an accused. Counsel must confer 
with his client without undue delay and as often as necessary, to advise him of his rights 
and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable. 
Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if 
matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough time for reflection 
and preparation for trial.  
Id. at 1203, n.22 (citing Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d at 226). 
 46. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 133. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 135. See also Williams, supra note 10, at 147-54. Williams enumerates four specific 
standards governing qualification, compensations, conflicts of interest, and the duty to investigate, that 
should be required of every lawyer representing a capital defendant. With respect to the duty to 
investigate, Williams states: 
The most basic duty that an attorney has in any case is to conduct an investigation. The 
Supreme Court has made it clear that counsel has a duty to investigate the defendant’s 
background for potential mitigating evidence. The court needs to make it equally clear 
that counsel has a duty to prepare for the guilt-innocence phase of the proceedings as 
well. . . . Since claims and defenses must be asserted during the initial stages of a capital 
case[s], the court should make it explicit that counsel has a duty to investigate any 
potential defenses available to the defendant before reaching a conclusion as to whether 
it should be asserted and that the failure to conduct a thorough pre-trial investigation 
constitutes ineffective assistance. 
Id. at 153-54. 
 49. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 135. 
 50. Id. at 138 (quoting Coles, 389 F.2d at 226). 
 51. DeCoster I, 487 F.2d at 1204. 
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prejudice may well be absent from the record precisely because counsel has been 
ineffective . . . [f]or example, when counsel fails to conduct an investigation, the 
record may not indicate which witnesses he could have called, or defenses he could 
have raised.”52 In essence, the burden-shifting approach reflected the pragmatic 
concern that “[m]uch of the evidence of counsel’s ineffectiveness is frequently not 
reflected in the trial record.”53 
Ultimately, Judge Bazelon’s “check-list” or “guideline” approach “attempted 
to define effective assistance of counsel in terms of services to defendants.”54 For 
Bazelon, “the right to effective counsel . . . is not dependent upon the strength of 
the evidence of the defendant’s guilt”55 because “minimum requirements of 
competent attorney performance . . . would give substance to the Sixth Amendment 
mandate.”56 In Judge Bazelon’s view, every defendant was constitutionally entitled 
to an “active advocate,” and “[w]here such advocacy is absent, the accused has 
been denied effective assistance, regardless of his guilt or innocence.”57 
B. Strickland v. Washington Explicitly Rejects the Guideline Approach and Adopts 
a Standard That Renders It Nearly Impossible to Establish Ineffective Assistance 
1.  Rejection of the Guideline Approach 
Strickland dealt a devastating blow to those who supported the adoption of 
specific standards to guide the performance of counsel in criminal cases.58 By way 
                                                                                                     
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 138. As Blume and Neumann observe, perhaps the 
greatest “service” to a defendant is to engage in a “robust investigation” that uncovers all possible 
defenses and avenues for mitigating evidence: 
A robust investigation was an essential demand of effective representation. . . .  First, in 
order for the adversary system to function properly, both sides must prepare and 
organize their cases in advance of trial. . . . Second, proper investigation is critical to 
uncovering favorable facts and allows trial counsel to take full advantage of procedural 
safeguards for achieving a reliable verdict such as cross-examination and impeachment. 
. . . Third, investigation ensures that attorneys proffer all possible legal defenses and 
demand that the government prove the defendant’s guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Finally, investigation is essential for procedural matters outside of trial, such as . . . 
urging for the reduction or dismissal of charges, and advocating for appropriate pleas 
and favorable sentences. Consequently, the attorney who is ineffective in the 
investigative phase might never be able to rectify her performance and provide her 
client with an adequate defense. 
Id. at 139. 
 55. Id. at 138. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 138-39 (quoting United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster III), 624 F.2d 196, 288 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (Bazelon, J., dissenting)). 
 58. 466 U.S. at 688-89.  In Strickland, the defendant pled guilty to an indictment that included three 
capital murder charges. The defendant also represented to the Court that he had no significant prior 
criminal record and that he was under severe stress at the time the murders were committed. During the 
sentencing phase, defense counsel failed to conduct a thorough investigation into the defendant’s 
background, which included a failure to contact character witnesses or seek a psychiatric examination. 
Counsel believed that the inclusion of such evidence would only allow the prosecutor to come forth with 
more damaging evidence against the defendant and, on this basis he decided that such evidence should 
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of brief background, before Judge Bazelon’s endorsement of the guideline 
approach, and prior to Strickland, “lower courts struggled to develop an appropriate 
standard by which to gauge the quality of counsel’s representation.”59 In fact, to the 
extent that any review of counsel’s performance existed, “the prevailing standard 
lower courts used to determine whether counsel’s conduct satisfied the Sixth 
Amendment was the ‘farce and mockery’ test.”60 Pursuant to this test, the courts 
“asked only whether counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness was so prevalent that it made 
the proceedings a ‘farce and mockery of justice,’ thereby depriving the defendant 
of the constitutional right to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause.”61 As one 
Commentator aptly noted, “[t]his test frequently left shockingly poor representation 
beyond the reach of courts to remedy.”62  
Importantly, in McMann v. Richardson,63 the Court attempted to provide more 
guidance, albeit generally, governing the standards for attorney incompetence.64 
Unfortunately, because “trial courts had little incentive to create high standards for 
appointed counsel absent more specific higher court prompting . . . [l]ower courts 
often required the attorney to do little more than not make a ‘farce or mockery’ of 
justice, or not be grossly incompetent.”65 Significantly, however, with the advent of 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Coles, coupled with Judge Bazelon’s guideline 
approach to effective representation (as well as his burden-shifting paradigm), the 
courts began to develop a standard of representation which ensured that counsel’s 
performance comported with the defendant’s fundamental right to effective 
representation.  
Unfortunately, however, Strickland permanently changed this landscape by 
expressly rejecting the guideline or check-list approach to attorney representation.66  
                                                                                                     
not be introduced. As a result, counsel instead decided to rely upon the plea colloquy as evidence of the 
defendant’s remorse. Ultimately, the defendant was sentenced to death, and in his appeal, defendant 
alleged that he had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. 
Id. 
 59. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 131. 
 60. Id. In their Article, Blume and Neumann further note that the Supreme Court subsequently 
modified the “farce and mockery” test to suggest that “a defendant would prevail in proving he had 
ineffective assistance if counsel’s conduct was not ‘within the [wide] range of competence demanded of 
attorneys in criminal cases.’” The Authors are careful to note, however, that “[o]bservers largely 
criticized this vague test . . . on the basis that it was not significantly different from the ‘farce and 
mockery’ standard.”  Id.  at 131-32. 
 61. Id. at 131. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
 64. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. According to one Commentator, the Supreme Court arguably 
attempted to establish standards for attorney representation in McMann, in which the Court stated: 
[T]he matter . . . should be left to the good sense and discretion of the trial courts with 
the admonition that if the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its 
purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that 
judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are 
representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts. 
Levinson, supra note 33, at 153 (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 771). 
 65. Id. at 154. 
 66. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 140 (explaining that Judge Bazelon’s guideline approach 
was part of a larger debate among the judges on the D.C. Circuit in the DeCoster cases concerning the 
most appropriate method by which to assess ineffective assistance claims. In the end, “the categorical 
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In its seminal decision concerning the effective assistance of counsel, Strickland 
single-handedly defined the framework that would govern ineffective assistance 
claims for the next twenty-five years.67 In its decision, while recognizing that the 
right to counsel implicates the right to “effective assistance of counsel,”68 the Court 
steadfastly held that “specific guidelines are not appropriate.”69  In so holding, the 
Court stated: 
The Sixth Amendment refers simply to “counsel,” not specifying particular 
requirements of effective assistance . . . .  In any case presenting an ineffectiveness 
claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was 
reasonable considering all the circumstances. Prevailing norms of practice as 
reflected in the American Bar Association Standards and the like . . . are guides to 
determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular set of 
detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of 
circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions 
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would 
interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict 
the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions . . . .  Indeed, the 
existence of detailed guidelines for representation could distract counsel from the 
overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant’s cause. Moreover, the 
purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to 
improve the quality of legal representation . . . [but] simply to ensure that criminal 
defendants receive a fair trial.70 
Thus, the Strickland Court was unequivocal that counsel’s duties did not “form a 
checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance,”71 and instead needed 
only to satisfy a “highly deferential”72 review that merely looked to whether 
counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”73 
Ultimately, therefore, the guideline approach that was advocated by Judge 
Bazelon, the Fourth Circuit in Coles, and the ABA was rejected by the Supreme 
                                                                                                     
standard approach did not prove to be the prevailing standard. . . . [The] majority opinion rejected Judge 
Bazelon’s theory, preferring instead a case-by-case approach to ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
similar to the method subsequently embraced by the Supreme Court in Strickland.”). 
 67. By way of brief background, the constitutional right to counsel was first recognized in Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), where the Supreme Court based the recognition of such right to 
defendants in capital cases upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Subsequently, in 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court extended the right to counsel to all criminal 
defendants, not just those charged with capital crimes. 
 68. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. In Strickland, the Court began its analysis by explaining: 
The Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the constitutional requirement of 
effective assistance in the latter class of cases—that is, those presenting claims of 
“actual ineffectiveness.” In giving meaning to this requirement, however, we must take 
its purpose—to ensure a fair trial—as the guide. The benchmark for judging any claim 
of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result.  
Id. 
 69. Id. at 688. 
 70. Id. at 688-89 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 71. Id. at 688. 
 72. Id. at 689. 
 73. Id. at 688. 
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Court, and in its place was instituted a two-pronged standard for reviewing 
ineffective assistance claims that has single-handedly lead to some of the worst 
lawyering for those defendants who have the most at stake during trial—their 
lives.74  
2. The Nearly Impenetrable Two-Pronged Standard for Ineffective Assistance:  
Unreasonableness and Prejudice 
In eschewing the guidelines approach, the Strickland Court held that “[a] 
convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require 
reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components.”75 According to the 
Court, “[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 
deficient.”76 Additionally, “the defendant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.”77 As set forth below, this standard made it virtually 
impossible for a defendant to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel on 
appeal, while simultaneously tolerating incredibly incompetent representation of 
defendants charged with capital offenses. 
a. The Performance Prong 
With respect to the performance prong, the Strickland Court began by stating 
that “the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective 
assistance.”78 Accordingly, to demonstrate that an attorney’s representation was 
                                                                                                     
 74. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 706-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Importantly, Justice Marshall’s 
dissenting opinion in Strickland predicted precisely the type of substandard representation that would 
characterize attorney performance throughout the next twenty years. In his dissent, Justice Marshall 
stated: 
My objection to the performance standard adopted by the Court is that it is so malleable 
that, in practice, it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the 
manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts. To 
tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal defendant must behave 
“reasonable” and must act like “a reasonably competent attorney” . . . is to tell them 
almost nothing  . . .  the Court has thereby not only abdicated its own responsibility to 
interpret the Constitution, but also impaired the ability of the lower courts to exercise 
theirs. 
Id. at 707-08 (citation omitted).  With respect to the issue of prejudice, Justice Marshall stated: 
[I]t is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in which he 
was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his lawyer had been competent. 
Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel . . 
. The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are exacerbated by the possibility 
that evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from the record precisely 
because of the incompetence of defense counsel. In view of all these impediments  . . .  
it seems to me senseless to impose on a defendant whose lawyer has been shown to 
have been incompetent the burden of demonstrating prejudice.  
Id. at 710. 
 75. Id. at 687 (majority opinion). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 687-88. In rejecting the establishment of specific guidelines, the Court discussed the 
notion of “reasonableness” in the ineffective assistance context:  
Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel’s function is 
to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to 
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constitutionally deficient, “the defendant must show that counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”79 In so holding, and as stated 
supra, the Court specifically rejected the use of guidelines in making this 
determination, and instead directed courts to focus upon “whether counsel’s 
assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.”80  
Furthermore, in making the reasonableness determination, the Court stated that 
“[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.”81 In so 
holding, the Court stated: 
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s 
perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the 
evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant 
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 
action “might be considered sound trial strategy.”82 
In fact, in making the reasonableness determination, the Strickland Court stated 
that lower courts “should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment.”83 The Court went so far as to state that 
“strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”84  
                                                                                                     
avoid conflicts of interest. From counsel’s function as assistant to the defendant derive 
the overarching duty to advocate the defendant’s cause and the more particular duties to 
consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed 
of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to 
bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial 
testing process. . . . [However], [t]hese basic duties neither exhaustively define the 
obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney 
performance. 
Id. at 687-88 (citations omitted). 
 79. Id. at 688. 
 80. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
 81. Id. at 689. The Court also stated that “when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that 
pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those 
investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.” Id. at 691. 
 82. Id. at 689. 
 83. Id. at 690. 
 84. Id. (emphasis added). Importantly, the majority stressed the theme throughout Strickland was 
one of deference to trial counsel’s performance, even in the face of decisions that might otherwise seem 
questionable. The Court’s stated position that “counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate 
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment,” was 
predicated upon a desire to lower scrutiny of defense counsel’s performance on appellate review: 
The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed 
guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness 
challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly 
come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel’s unsuccessful defense. 
Counsel’s performance and even willingness to serve could be adversely affected. 
Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could 
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Ultimately, what the Strickland Court was trying to accomplish—both in 
rejecting specific guidelines and implementing a “highly deferential”85 
reasonableness review—was both the reduction of ineffective assistance claims and 
the likelihood that such claims, if brought on appeal, would fail.86 In fact, the 
Strickland Court did not shy away from this objective, stating that “[t]he 
availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed 
guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness 
challenges.”87 Of course, while the reasonableness prong certainly made it difficult 
for defendants to demonstrate ineffective assistance, the prejudice prong rendered it 
nearly impossible. 
b. The Prejudice Prong 
In shifting to the prejudice aspect of its analysis, the Court emphasized that 
even if counsel’s performance was “professionally unreasonable,”88 it would not 
support vacating the conviction if “the error had no effect on the judgment.”89 In 
the Court’s view, because “the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure 
that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of 
the proceeding,”90 any defects in counsel’s performance must “be prejudicial to the 
defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.”91 
Furthermore, the burden weighed on the defendant to “affirmatively prove 
prejudice”92 because “[a]ttorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely 
to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial.”93 As a 
result, “[e]ven if a defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were 
unreasonable . . . the defendant must show that they actually had an adverse effect 
                                                                                                     
dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the 
acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client. 
Id. 
 85. Id. at 689. 
 86. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 691.  
 89. Id.  The Court’s prejudice requirement was premised upon its interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment, which it claimed was to “ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify 
reliance on the outcome of the proceeding” and not simply to effectuate effective assistance per se.  Id. 
at 691-92. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 692.  The Court was careful to note, of course, that there were certain situations in which 
prejudice would be presumed. For example, the “[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of 
counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice.”  Id.  In addition, “so are various kinds of 
state interference with counsel’s assistance.” Id.  See also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 
(1984).  Finally, the Court explained that prejudice would be presumed “when counsel is burdened by an 
actual conflict of interest.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 341, 345-50 
(1984)).  With respect to conflict of interest issues, however, the Court cautioned that “the rule is not 
quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the Sixth Amendment claims mentioned above [actual or 
constructive denial of assistance of counsel or state interference with the right to counsel].”  Id.  Instead, 
the Court held that “[p]rejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively 
represented conflicting interests,’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s 
performance.’” Id. (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350). 
 92. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. 
 93. Id. 
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on the outcome.”94 
In making the requisite showing, however, the Court held that “[i]t is not 
enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the 
outcome of the proceeding.”95 Rather, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”96 The Court went on to define “reasonable 
probability” as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”97 
Thus, “[w]hen a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is 
a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a 
reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”98 
Essentially, the Court’s “prejudice” prong required a post hoc review of the 
alleged errors, which was surprising given that the Court had emphasized earlier in 
its opinion the need to eliminate “the distorting effects of hindsight”99 and avoid 
“reconstruct[ing] the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct.”100 
Ostensibly, although these principles were integral to the Court’s analysis when 
developing the “reasonableness” prong, they did not seem to carry any weight as 
the Court developed its nearly impenetrable “prejudice” standard.101 The reason for 
this, according to the Court, was that, “the purpose of the effective assistance 
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id. The origin of the Court’s prejudice requirement can be traced to the following passage in 
Strickland: 
Conflict of interest claims aside, actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in 
attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant 
affirmatively prove prejudice. The government is not responsible for, and hence not able 
to prevent, attorney errors that will result in reversal of a conviction or sentence. 
Attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a 
particular case as they are to be prejudicial. They cannot be classified according to 
likelihood of causing prejudice. Nor can they be defined with sufficient precision to 
inform defense attorneys correctly just what conduct to avoid. Representation is an art, 
and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant 
in another. Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were 
unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must show that they actually had an adverse 
effect on the defense. 
Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 694. 
 97. Id.  In establishing the parameters for ineffective assistance, the Court stated: 
In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in the required 
prejudice, a court should presume, absent challenge to the judgment on grounds of 
evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted according to law. An assessment 
of the likelihood of a result more favorable to the defendant must exclude the possibility 
of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, “nullification,” and the like. A defendant has no 
entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker, even if a lawless decision cannot be 
reviewed. The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the 
decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards 
that govern the decision.   
Id. at 694-95. 
 98. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
 99. Id. at 689. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 695. 
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representation,”102 but to ensure simply “that criminal defendants receive a fair 
trial.”103  
Not insignificantly, the Court was also aware that more accountability 
standards or detailed guidelines “would encourage the proliferation of 
ineffectiveness challenges,”104 which the Court sought to avoid.  Ultimately, 
therefore, what resulted was such a difficult standard that, for the next sixteen 
years, the Court found not one single instance of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.105  Importantly, however, the Strickland decision is notable not simply for 
what it failed to do, but for the horrific state of representation that it produced, both 
in capital and non-capital cases.  
c. Ineffective Assistance After Strickland 
As a practical matter, the two-pronged standard created by the Court in 
Strickland “proved virtually impossible for defendants to meet, and instead of 
raising the bar for effective counsel, the Court created a bar to nearly all assertions 
of attorney inadequacy.”106  Indeed, during the sixteen years after Strickland, in 
which “the Supreme Court itself failed to find a single instance of constitutionally 
inadequate representation,”107 nearly all representation was “found to be within 
                                                                                                     
 102. Id. at 689. 
 103. Id.  When considering the Court’s notion that the Sixth Amendment was intended merely to 
ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial, an often overlooked passage in Strickland intimates that the 
success of an ineffectiveness claim is more likely to hinge upon the strength of the prosecution’s case 
rather than the quality of trial counsel’s performance: 
In making this determination [concerning ineffectiveness] a court . . . must consider the 
totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Some of the factual findings will have 
been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were affected will have been 
affected in different ways. Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and 
some will have an isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly 
supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with 
overwhelming record support. Taking the unaffected findings as a given, and taking due 
account of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court making the 
prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the 
decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors. 
Id.  at 695-96 (emphasis added). 
 104. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
 105. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 134. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 134. See also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).  Significantly, the Court’s decision 
in Murray also contributed to a defendant’s diminished chances of succeeding on ineffectiveness claims 
because it held that neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause requires the states to 
appoint counsel for indigent defendants seeking post-conviction relief.  This is critical because post-
conviction relief is precisely the path upon which most defendants seek to demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance at the underlying trial was ineffective. In rejecting the requirement that defendants be 
appointed counsel for post-conviction proceedings, the Murray majority reasoned: 
In [Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987)], we ruled that neither the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the equal protection guarantee of “meaningful 
access” required the State to appoint counsel for indigent prisoners seeking 
postconviction relief. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution assure 
the right of an indigent defendant to counsel at the trial stage of a criminal proceeding . . 
. [w]e [formerly] contrasted the trial stage of a criminal proceeding, where the State by 
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Strickland’s ‘wide range of professionally competent assistance.’”108 In fact, 
“[e]ven in capital cases, where life and death literally hung in the balance, courts 
often deferred to incomprehensible ‘strategic’ decisions provided by trial counsel 
rationalizing their slothful representation.”109 Unfortunately, in striving to reduce 
the volume and success of ineffective assistance claims, Strickland created a 
standard that “is a very low one”110 that “was not intended to impose rigorous 
standards on criminal defense attorneys,”111 and that promoted the “tolerance of 
abysmal lawyering.”112  
In fact, the type of representation that is tolerated under Strickland—
particularly for capital defendants whose lives are at stake—continues to be horrific 
and is the antithesis of fairness and due process of law.113 One Commentator 
explains the appalling instances of attorney incompetence: 
Lawyers have been found to be drunk or drugged, mentally ill, or asleep while 
representing a defendant. In addition, several recent studies of capital trials reveal 
that lawyers who represented death row inmates at trial were subsequently 
disbarred, suspended, or otherwise disciplined at a rate three to forty-six times the 
average for the relevant states. . . . For those attorneys whose clients were 
                                                                                                     
presenting witnesses and arguing to a jury attempts to strip from the defendant the 
presumption of innocence and convict him of a crime, with the appellate stage of such a 
proceeding, where the defendant needs an attorney “not as a shield to protect him 
against being ‘hauled into court’ by the State and stripped of his presumption of 
innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt.”  
Murray, 492 U.S. at 7 (quoting Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974)). 
 108. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 142 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 
 109. Id. As Blume and Neumann explain, after Strickland, the Court decided two cases that 
demonstrated how deferential it would be towards glaring examples of attorney incompetence.  In 
Darden v. Wainwright, the defendant’s ineffective assistance claim was predicated upon the fact that his 
attorney failed to present any mitigating evidence whatsoever at his sentencing hearing. 477 U.S. 168 
(1986). Ostensibly, trial counsel initially believed that his client did not qualify for any of the mitigating 
factors under the relevant Florida statute but then conceded that “I was completely unaware that any 
mitigating circumstance, if relevant, is admissible.” Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 148 (citation 
omitted). The Court, however, ultimately denied defendant’s claim because the trial court eventually 
informed counsel that it could present mitigating evidence concerning any fact that might have been 
pertinent. In this way, according to Blume and Neumann, “this choice to present no mitigating evidence 
in light of a stated and actual misunderstanding of the law was objectively reasonable; the Court gave 
short shrift to Darden’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Id.  Even worse, in Burger v. Kemp, the 
Court rejected defendant’s ineffective assistance claim when defense counsel failed to present any 
mitigating evidence whatsoever at the sentencing phase. 483 U.S. 776 (1987). This time, however, there 
was evidence that Burger had an IQ that bordered on mental retardation and had an abusive family 
history that resulted in Burger suffering from various psychological problems. Counsel had ample 
opportunity to consult with defendant’s family, all of whom were willing to testify concerning the abuse 
that Burger suffered. Ultimately, counsel halted his investigation and presented no mitigating evidence. 
His stated reason not to petition the court for a complete psychological examination of his client was 
based on his “experience with the mental hospital,” which he thought was “biased against defendants 
generally.” Id.  In its decision, while the Court found that counsel’s investigative efforts could have been 
more thorough, it concluded that counsel’s efforts were objectively reasonable. Id. 
 110. Cooley, supra note 9, at 76. 
 111. Id. (quoting White, supra note 9, at 333). 
 112. Id. (quoting Giemer, supra note 20, at 94). 
 113. See generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) (describing the pervasive problem of 
deficient resources to ensure competent counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases). 
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executed, the rate of disciplinary sanctions was almost forty times that of the bar 
as a whole.114 
Indeed, “[i]n many instances, appellate courts have found that an appointed lawyer 
was completely unqualified to handle a capital case.”115 In such cases, for example, 
lawyers were “unaware of the governing death penalty statute,”116 “not even aware 
that a separate sentencing proceeding would be held in a capital case,”117 or  “never 
tried a case to a jury before, and . . . failed to investigate physical evidence.”118  
Perhaps the most shocking aspect of these egregious examples of attorney 
incompetence is that, pursuant to Strickland, they were not deemed to constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.119  
For example, in Bellamy v. Cogdell,120 the defendant, who was charged with 
second-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon,121 sought post-
conviction relief on the grounds that, pursuant to Strickland, he had been denied the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.122 Specifically, in the months preceding trial, 
the defendant’s attorney “was the subject of disciplinary proceedings,”123 which 
consisted of allegations that he “negligently handled a real estate transaction”124 
and improperly “converted client funds.”125 Perhaps more importantly, in the 
month prior to the trial’s commencement, the disciplinary proceeding was 
postponed because the defendant’s counsel was “not mentally capable of preparing 
for the hearing.”126 Indeed, the defendant’s attorney was observed as having 
suffered from “a certain amount of disorientation,”127 and was later diagnosed with 
“a variety of physiological ailments, including a . . . condition ‘characterized by 
                                                                                                     
 114. Benson-Amram, supra note 11, at 431-33 (citing Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996); 
United States v. St. Germain, 76 F.3d 376, 1996 WL 43578, at *4-5 (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 1996) (per curiam); 
Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc)). See also Marcia Coyle, Fred Strasser 
& Marianne Lavelle, Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation’s Death Belt, NAT’L L.J., June 11, 
1990, at 30, 44; Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and 
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 398 (1995). 
 115. Benson-Amram, supra note 11, at 433. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 434. 
 119. See, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950, 964 (5th Cir. 2000); Tippins, 77 F.3d at 687; Fisher 
v. State, 739 P.2d 523, 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); Commonwealth v. Vance, 546 A.2d 632, 638 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1988). 
 120. 974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
 121. Id. at 303. By way of factual background, Bellamy was on trial for his alleged participation in 
the murder of State Parole Office Brian Rooney. Apparently, an individual named Lorenzo Nichols, 
who was incarcerated, ordered Rooney’s murder, and Bellamy lured Rooney to the location where he 
was ultimately murdered. After three weeks of trial and five days of jury deliberations, the jury 
convicted Bellamy of second-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Bellamy, 974 F.2d at 303.  In fact, a disciplinary hearing on these matters was scheduled for 
December 11, 1986, concerning these alleged improprieties; however, that hearing was postponed due to 
defense counsel’s various medical conditions, which rendered him incapable of adequately preparing. 
 126. Id. (citation omitted). 
 127. Id. (citation omitted). 
2010] CAPITAL REPRESENTATION 117 
peripheral motor weakness.’”128  
During this time, purportedly as a result of “physical and emotional stress,”129 
the defendant’s lawyer had been “virtually incapacitated”130 and had “an inability 
to concentrate.”131 Based upon his condition, the treatment of which would take 
between three to six months and would result in some incapacitation, the 
defendant’s lawyer represented to the bar that he would secure co-counsel to assist 
at the defendant’s trial.132 Ultimately, the co-counsel had an unexpected scheduling 
conflict and the original attorney undertook representation alone.133 The defendant 
was convicted, and approximately two months later, the defendant’s counsel was 
suspended from practicing law.134 Based upon these and other grounds, the 
defendant claimed that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel. 
The Second Circuit, however, rejected this claim, asserting that counsel’s 
behavior did not “approach the type of fraudulent behavior” that the court had 
found previously to constitute ineffective assistance.135 Moreover, in denying the 
                                                                                                     
 128. Id. at 303 (citation omitted). More specifically, the court described trial counsel’s medical 
condition as follows: 
According to Dr. Cohen [trial counsel’s physician], Guren [defense counsel] suffered 
from a variety of physiological ailments, including a recently diagnosed 
polyneuropathy, a condition “characterized by peripheral motor weakness [and] 
unsteadiness” on one’s feet. Dr. Cohen had been treating Guren for that condition for 
the preceding six weeks. During that time, as a result of the “physical and emotional 
stress” associated with Guran’s recently discovered illness and of certain medications, 
Guran had been “virtually incapacitated.” Dr. Cohen also noted that as a result of that 
condition, Guran “at times” had “an inability to concentrate.” The prognosis for Guran’s 
newly discovered condition was uncertain at that time, but Dr. Cohen “anticipated” that 
evaluation and treatment of the polyneuropathy would take three to six months, and that 
Guran would be “effectively incapacitated during that time.” 
Id. at 303-04. 
 129. Id. at 304 (citation omitted). 
 130. Id. (citation omitted). 
 131. Bellamy, 974 F.2d at 304 (citation omitted). 
 132. Id.  Critically, after the postponement of the November 10 hearing, the disciplinary committee 
sought to have Guran suspended immediately and indefinitely from the practice of law. Guran 
responded that such suspension was not necessary because, among other things, he was now retired and 
working solely on Bellamy’s case. Furthermore, with respect to Bellamy’s representation, Guran 
certified: 
I, of course, will not attempt to try this case by myself. I will have a competent attorney, 
but I must be present to assist him. Bellamy relies on, and strictly trusts only me and his 
mother has paid me. It would be a complete disservice to this defendant and jeopardize 
his right to a fair trial if I were not permitted to assist in his trial and defense. 
Id.  Ultimately, Guran did advise the trial court about his medical issues and pending disciplinary 
charges. Id. In addition, while Guran did retain co-counsel prior to trial, he ultimately represented 
Guran alone when co-counsel became involved with another case during the time of defendant’s 
trial.  Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 307.  Note, however, that in Bellamy, the defendant argued that counsel’s errors 
constituted a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment, and thus did not require the Court to apply 
Strickland’s two-pronged standard. In rejecting defendant’s contention, the Second Circuit stated: 
This court has found such per se violations in two limited circumstances: where, 
unknown to the defendant, his or her counsel was, at the time of trial (1) not duly 
licensed to practice law because of a failure ever to meet the substantive requirements 
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defendant’s claim, the court placed emphasis on the fact that counsel never 
“intentionally misrepresented that he would secure co-counsel,”136 and “informed 
the court of his pending disciplinary hearing,”137 as well as “possible immediate 
suspension.”138 Based upon these facts, which did not relate whatsoever to 
counsel’s actual performance at trial, the court found that “it cannot be said that 
[counsel’s] conduct approached the egregious deceptive behavior of counsel”139 
that would, under Strickland, constitute a Sixth Amendment violation.  
In addition, courts have rarely found alleged active drug use by defense 
attorneys as a basis for Sixth Amendment violations.140 For example, in Berry v. 
King,141 the defendant was charged and convicted of first-degree murder in 
connection with a bank robbery.142 In asserting that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel, the defendant claimed that his counsel’s drug addiction 
resulted in a failure to “adequately investigate and prepare for the defense of his 
case.”143 Specifically, during the sentencing phase, counsel introduced not a single 
witness on the defendant’s behalf, and offered no evidence whatsoever in 
mitigation of the defendant’s culpability.144 Despite these facts, the Fifth Circuit 
found that there was no violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.145 With 
respect to the issue of counsel’s drug use, the court held that “under Strickland the 
fact that an attorney used drugs is not, in and of itself, relevant to an ineffective 
assistance claim.”146  
This approach was underscored in State v. Coates,147 where the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
for the practice of law . . .  or (2) implicated in the defendant’s crimes. . . . Even on 
these occasions, we have applied the per se rule “without enthusiasm.”  
Id. at 306. 
 136. Id. at 307. 
 137. Bellamy, 974 F.2d at 307. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 308. 
 140. See, e.g., Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1985); State v. Coates, 786 P.2d 1182 (Mont. 
1982). 
 141. Berry, 765 F.2d at 451. 
 142. Id. at 452. 
 143. Id. at 454. The court summarized Berry’s assertions: 
Berry’s contentions of ineffective assistance essentially fall into two closely related 
categories. First, Berry contends that as a result of his alleged drug addition Blanche 
[defense counsel] failed to adequately investigate and prepare for the defense of his 
case. This lack of investigation and preparation allegedly caused Blanche to fail to 
locate witnesses who could have supplied exculpatory information in the guilt phase and 
mitigating testimony in the penalty phase. Second, Berry contends that Blanche’s drug 
use, plus his failure to investigate, prevented him [from] making any sort of organized 
presentation during the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. Berry contends that in 
the guilt phase this caused Blanche to stipulate to the “functional equivalent of a plea of 
guilty” without Berry’s consent. He further contends that during the sentencing phase 
Blanche was unable to make more than a “tepid” plea for his client’s life. 
Id. 
 144. Id. at 452. 
 145. Id. at 454-55. 
 146. Id. at 454 (emphasis omitted). 
 147. 786 P.2d at 1185-86. In Coates, the defendant, who was convicted of felony theft, alleged that 
his counsel made the following errors: (1) failure to object to the use of statements made by the 
defendant prior to reading the defendant his Miranda warnings; (2) opening the door to testimony 
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of Montana held that trial counsel’s “cocaine abuse, which [had] become public 
knowledge,” did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.148 In fact, the court 
held that, unless the defendant could expressly connect “specific errors or 
conduct”149 to the admitted drug abuse, then “cocaine abuse is irrelevant to the 
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.”150 Courts have also applied this exact 
logic to allegations of alcohol abuse. For example, in People v. Garrison,151 the 
California Supreme Court held that, although trial counsel was “an alcoholic at the 
time of trial and that he has since died of the disease,”152 there was no Sixth 
Amendment violation because, under Strickland, the defendant could not 
specifically demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient.153 Likewise, in 
Burnett v. Collins,154 the Fifth Circuit held that despite the fact that the defendant 
“could smell alcohol on his attorney’s breath; and after trial, his counsel entered a 
                                                                                                     
concerning prior convictions; (3) failure to suppress evidence seized from the back of the defendant’s 
vehicle by challenging the probable cause of the search warrant; (4) failure to obtain witnesses that were 
necessary for his defense; (5) inadequate preparation for trial; (6) failure to properly question the 
witnesses; (7) failure to appeal several issues; and (8) defense counsel’s drug abuse, which allegedly 
affected his ability to effectively represent the defendant. In denying defendant’s ineffective assistance 
claim, the Court emphasized that it would not “second guess trial tactics [and strategy].” Id. at 1186. 
 148. Id. at 1186-87. 
 149. Id. at 1187. 
 150. Id. 
 151. People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 426, 439-43 (Cal. 1989).  See also Frye v. Lee, 89 F. Supp. 2d 
693, 708 (W.D. N.C. 2000) (holding that trial counsel’s alcohol abuse in and of itself is insufficient to 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel).  In Garrison, the defendant was found guilty of robbery, 
burglary, and two counts of first-degree murder, for which he was sentenced to death. On appeal, 
defendant asserted that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his counsel was an 
admitted alcoholic during the entire time that the trial was conducted. Defendant specifically contested 
that trial counsel’s alcoholism constituted a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment. In rejecting this 
contention, the Supreme Court of California stated: 
Although it is uncontested that Beardsley [defense counsel] was an alcoholic at the time 
of trial and that he has since died of the disease, defendant has failed to prove that 
Beardsley’s performance was deficient. His reliance on a per se rule of deficiency for 
alcoholic attorneys is contrary to settled law. . . .  It is undisputed that Beardsley was an 
alcoholic at the time of his representation and that he consumed large amounts of 
alcohol each day of the trial. The declarations in the petition and traverse indicate that 
Beardsley drank in the morning, during court recesses, and throughout the evening. 
Although these declarations confirm that Beardsley was an alcoholic, they do not 
address whether Beardsley’s addiction adversely affected his courtroom performance to 
such an extent that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.  Statements 
made by the bailiff . . . Hector Delgadillo, declares that he was in close contact with 
Beardsley throughout the trial [and] that Beardsley always smelled of alcohol. . . . [In 
addition], on the second day of jury selection, Beardsley was arrested for driving to the 
courthouse with a .27 blood-alcohol content. . . . The judge stated that Beardsley’s 
courtroom behavior had not given him any reason to believe that Beardsley should not 
continue and told defendant, “I personally can assure you that you probably have one of 
the finest defense counsel in this county. . . . ” Our review of the facts indicate that 
Beardsley did a fine job in this case . . . there is no authority for the type of per se rule 
espoused by defendant. 
Garrison, 765 P.2d at 440-41. 
 152. Id. at 440. 
 153. Id. at 440-41. 
 154. 982 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1993). 
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facility for treatment of alcohol abuse,” there was no violation of the right to 
counsel because the defendant could identify “no specific instances where 
counsel’s performance . . . was deficient because of alcohol abuse.”155 
More startling, perhaps, is the fact that ineffective assistance claims have been 
rejected under Strickland where trial counsel has slept during portions of the 
trial.156 For example, in United States v. Muyet,157 while the court actually 
acknowledged that even if counsel was, in fact, sleeping in court, the trial court 
denied the defendant’s ineffective assistance claim because he was not “in a state 
of unconsciousness (actually snoring in the courtroom) throughout the trial.”158  As 
a result, despite periods of falling asleep during trial, counsel’s conduct was 
deemed not to fall below “prevailing professional norms.”159 Similarly, in Tippins 
v. Walker,160 the Second Circuit held that “[p]rolonged inattention during stretches 
of a long trial (by sleep, preoccupation or otherwise) . . .  may be quantitatively 
substantial but without consequence.”161 Likewise, in Burdine v. Johnson,162 the 
Fifth Circuit stated that “we decline to adopt a per se rule that any dozing by 
defense counsel during trial merits a presumption of prejudice [under 
Strickland].”163  
Finally, the courts have been reticent to find ineffective assistance even where 
there exists evidence that the defendant’s counsel is suffering from a mental 
illness.164 In Smith v. YLST,165 the defendant alleged that his trial counsel’s erratic 
behavior during trial was due to an underlying mental illness that affected his 
performance.166 Specifically, in declarations and supplemental material submitted 
by various individuals with knowledge of counsel’s behavior, including his 
associate and secretary, it was alleged that counsel was suffering from a “paranoid 
                                                                                                     
 155. Id. at 930. In fact, in rejecting the defendant’s contention, the court revealed just how difficult it 
is for a defendant to succeed in demonstrating that trial counsel’s substance abuse was sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant a finding of ineffective assistance: 
The critical inquiry [under Strickland] is whether, for whatever reason, counsel’s 
performance was deficient and whether that deficiency prejudiced the defendant. . . .  
Burnett’s claim is nothing more than a bare assertion that since his counsel abused 
alcohol, his counsel was ineffective. . . . Burnett has failed to even show that counsel 
was impaired during trial due to alcohol abuse. . . .  At the hearing, the investigator for 
the defense indicated that he did not observe defense counsel intoxicated during trial. 
Burnett’s defense counsel also testified that he was not intoxicated during the trial. 
Burnett has failed to show that his counsel was impaired at trial or that any impairment 
caused specific errors during trial . . . [w]e must, therefore, reject his contention that his 
attorney’s alcohol use resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 156. See, e.g., Burdine, 262 F.3d 336; Tippins, 77 F.3d 682. 
 157. 994 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 158. Id. at 560-61. 
 159. Id. at 561. 
 160. Tippins, 77 F.3d at 686. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Burdine, 262 F.3d 336. 
 163. Id. at 349. 
 164. See generally Smith v. YLST, 826 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. at 874. 
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psychotic reaction.”167 The declarations stated that counsel feared for his own 
safety and “that of his client because he believed that his client was the target of a 
murder conspiracy involving the victim’s relatives and lover.”168 It was also 
revealed that counsel “smoked marijuana one evening during the course of the 
trial”169 and told his secretary that “he was crazy and wanted to go to an insane 
asylum.”170 Counsel “also repeatedly expressed concern that people were going to 
try to kill him,” and the trial court observed that, at times, counsel’s behavior had 
been erratic.171 
This was not sufficient under Strickland, however, to constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The Ninth Circuit specifically found that “[a]lthough there is 
merit to the argument that a mentally unstable attorney may make errors of 
judgment,”172 there could be no violation of the Sixth Amendment unless the 
defendant could “point to specific errors or omissions which prejudiced his 
defense.”173 As a result, even if the defendant can demonstrate that trial counsel 
suffered from a “mental illness or defect”174 that had “some impact on the 
attorney’s professional judgment,”175 it would still not be enough to satisfy the 
Strickland standard unless it could also be proven that such illness was “manifested 
in his courtroom behavior and conduct of the trial.”176 
These cases provide a demonstration of the type of representation that 
Strickland tolerates, even when a defendant’s life is at stake. If a defendant proves 
that his counsel was using drugs,177 abusing alcohol,178 sleeping during portions of 
the trial,179 or suffering from mental illness,180 this showing will not be even 
remotely close to the threshold necessary to demonstrate ineffective assistance.  
Furthermore, if a defendant can provide that any or all of these factors are present, 
and that they caused counsel’s performance to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, then relief still will not be provided unless a showing of prejudice 
can be made.  That is, a defendant can rarely, if ever, demonstrate conclusively, 
and through the “distorting effects of hindsight,”181 that, but for counsel’s 
                                                                                                     
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Smith, 826 F.2d at 874. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 876. In denying defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance, the court acknowledged, 
based upon evidence in the record, that “although Daul’s [defense counsel’s] behavior had at times been 
erratic, his conduct had no impact on the trial because the judge had not been influenced by Daul’s 
behavior.” Id. at 874. In addition, the Court relied upon the trial court’s finding in holding that “even if 
Daul was having some kind of breakdown, ‘the record and my recollection do not show any way in 
which the trial was distorted or the effectiveness of counsel was impaired by whatever conditions he 
had.’” Id. 
 173. Id. at 876. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Smith, 826 F.2d at 876. 
 177. Berry, 765 F.2d at 452. 
 178. Burnett, 982 F.2d at 930. 
 179. Muyet, 994 F. Supp. at 560. 
 180. Smith, 826 F.2d at 872. 
 181. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
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misfeasance, the outcome of the trial would have been different.182 Put another 
way, those fairly rare cases “that navigated safely through the performance prong 
channel generally went aground on the rock of prejudice.”183 
Stated simply, Strickland was, as a practical matter, impenetrable, and it was 
no accident that for sixteen years the Supreme Court found not a single case of 
ineffective assistance.184 In fact, at the state level, during the period from 1994 
through 2000, only thirty-four capital cases resulted in successful ineffective 
assistance claims.185 At the federal level, for this same period, only thirty-two 
capital cases successfully navigated through the Strickland standard.186 Quite 
simply, it should come as no surprise that, during this time, courts bore witness to 
particularly horrific examples of defense representation, made worse by the fact 
that, in many cases, a defendant’s life was at stake.  
Recently, however, some Commentators have found evidence of a 
                                                                                                     
 182. Id. at 694. 
 183. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 142.  See also Fogelman, supra note 12, at 78. With 
respect to Strickland’s second prong (the prejudice requirement), Fogelman states: 
A central reason that Strickland has been so heavily criticized for creating an “almost 
insurmountable hurdle” for defendants claiming ineffective assistance is the extreme 
difficulty in establishing the second prong—that the defendant was treated with actual 
prejudice because of counsel’s deficient conduct. Strickland stated that a defendant must 
show that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” The Court then defines a 
reasonable probability as “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 
Requiring a defendant to bear the burden of demonstrating a “reasonable probability” 
that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel’s ineffective 
assistance is merely a deceptive way of saying that the defendant must prove that he 
would have been acquitted. In other words, he must prove his innocence rather than 
forcing the state to prove his guilt. Strickland allows appellate courts to bypass the first 
prong of evaluating counsel’s performance and simply analyze the difficult-to-meet 
prejudice requirement, because if a defendant cannot effectively prove his innocence, 
his counsel’s performance is irrelevant. 
Id. at 78 (citations omitted). 
 184. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 134. 
 185. Id. at 156 tbl.1.  See also Fogelman, supra note 12, at 79-80. Fogelman states: 
[A]n appellate court can uphold a verdict particularly easily when the government has a 
strong case against the defendant, even though that is arguably when a defendant needs 
effective assistance of counsel the most. After Strickland, less than “mediocre 
assistance” is acceptable because Strickland’s broad deference to counsel’s 
performance allows appellate courts to merely view egregious errors as trial tactics. In 
applying Strickland, appellate courts tend to focus on errors of commission rather than 
omission because those courts are not easily able to “discern the prejudicial effects of 
errors of omission.” . . . As examples, the ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to 
interview a crucial defense or failing to object during direct examination could be the 
very reason that the record does not reflect any prejudice to a defendant for an appeals 
court to review. If defense counsel was sleeping, the record would be silent as to certain 
errors for exactly that reason—a dozing defense counsel is unable to speak or object, 
and the record, in turn, would reflect no error. . . . But Strickland has basically ensured 
that representation can be atrocious as long as defense counsel does not commit an 
egregious error on [the] record that cannot be explained away as strategy. 
Id. at 79-80 (citations omitted). 
 186. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 156 tbl.1. 
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“jurisprudential shift”187 in the Supreme Court’s analysis of ineffective assistance 
claims.188 Specifically, in the past eight years, the Court has found Sixth 
Amendment violations in three cases, and in each case the Court relied upon the 
respective trial counsel’s failure to follow the ABA Guidelines, which were in their 
third edition since the original version of 1970, as evidence of objectively 
unreasonable and prejudicial performance.189 As a result, Professor Neumann has 
declared that these decisions evince a “chink in Strickland’s armor” and a “shift 
towards . . . the standard . . . once hailed by Judge Bazelon.”190 In fact, Professor 
Neumann has gone so far as to state: 
[T]his shift [to a guideline approach] was intentional . . . [and] the reality was that 
in the hands of most state courts and many federal courts of appeal, the Strickland 
performance prong was license to do nothing. In essence, the Supreme Court 
realized that Strickland was part of the problem, not a solution to poor 
representation in capital cases. Capital defendants were frequently being 
represented by ineffective counsel, and the high threshold of the Strickland 
standard tied the hands of appellate courts from doing much about the problem.191 
In fact, Professor Neumann has declared that “faced with the reality of the 
representation and the ineffectiveness of the review process, the Court has adopted 
the general approach Judge Bazelon articulated thirty years prior.”192 
Importantly, however, although the Court’s decisions in Williams v. Taylor,193 
Wiggins v. Smith,194 and Rompilla v. Beard195 certainly demonstrate that the Court 
is reviewing trial counsel’s performance under a higher level of scrutiny, they 
presage neither the overruling of Strickland nor the adoption of specific guidelines 
by which counsel’s performance will be measured in future cases. While Williams, 
Wiggins, and Rompilla provide reason for optimism that the standards governing 
ineffective assistance claims are indeed beginning to evolve, they do not in and of 
themselves signify a substantial and sustained departure from the jurisprudence that 
continues to tolerate extraordinary examples of incompetent representation in 
capital cases.  In other words, defendants charged with some of the worst crimes 
are still the victims of terribly poor representation, and despite the Supreme Court’s 
recent rulings, the courts continue to be hostile to their ineffective assistance 
claims.196 This fact alone demonstrates that Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla 
represent the beginning, not the end, of the solution to nearly thirty years of 
injustice. An examination of these cases both reveals reason for hope but the 
continued necessity for sweeping change.197  
                                                                                                     
 187. Id. at 147. 
 188. See cases cited infra notes 193-95.  
 189. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 142-47. 
 190. Id. at 142, 152. 
 191. Id. at 153. 
 192. Id. at 154. 
 193. 529 U.S. 362. 
 194. 539 U.S. 510. 
 195. 545 U.S. 374. 
 196. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 142-47. 
 197. Id. at 160-61. 
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III.  THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT FINDS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN 
WILLIAMS V. TAYLOR, WIGGINS V. SMITH, AND ROMPILLA V. BEARD, WHILE RELYING 
UPON THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S GUIDELINES IN ASSESSING TRIAL 
COUNSEL’S PERFORMANCE 
As set forth above in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, although the Supreme 
Court found that trial counsels’ performance constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel, these decisions did not effectuate the sweeping change that is necessary to 
prevent the “abysmal lawyering”198 that continues to exist without remedy at both 
the state and federal levels. Although some Commentators believe that these 
decisions signified a return to a “guidelines” or “checklist” approach to ineffective 
assistance claims,199 such assertions, when analyzing each opinion, are overstated. 
A close analysis of each opinion reveals that Strickland continues to remain good 
law when ineffective assistance claims are raised.  
In addition, the ABA standards, although helpful, continue to serve merely as 
guides, which is precisely how the Court described them in Strickland, and do not 
operate as mandatory rules or benchmarks. Finally, at least one study conducted 
after these decisions were rendered reveals that there has been only a modest 
increase in the success of ineffective assistance claims, as courts continue to 
tolerate incompetent representation on behalf of capital defendants.200 As a result, 
the necessity for sweeping change could not be more evident. 
A.  Williams v. Taylor 
In Williams, the defendant was convicted of robbery and capital murder.201 
During his sentencing hearing, the prosecution introduced evidence of Williams’s 
prior convictions, which included armed robbery, burglary, and grand larceny.202 
The prosecution also introduced evidence relating to other violent felonies that 
Williams had committed after the murder, some of which were the subject of his 
                                                                                                     
 198. Cooley, supra note 9, at 77 (quoting Giemer, supra note 20, at 94). 
 199. Blume & Neumann, supra note 10, at 152-53. Indeed, when discussing Williams, Wiggins, and 
Rompilla, Blume and Neumann state: 
[T]he most significant doctrinal development was the Court’s reliance on the ABA’s 
Guidelines. The ABA Guidelines and Standards regarding the obligation to thoroughly 
investigate permeate Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla. Much like Judge Bazelon’s 
original checklist approach, the Court basically adopted the ABA’s Guideline 
requirements for investigation as establishing the prevailing norms for defense counsel. 
In effect, when considering the adequacy of trial counsel’s investigation, courts must 
now look to ABA standards, as well as local practice, in order to determine whether the 
Sixth Amendment has been satisfied. . . . In essence, these three decisions mark a shift 
towards the effective assistance of counsel standard once hailed by Judge Bazelon.  
Id. at 152-53. 
 200. Id. at 156-57. 
 201. Williams, 529 U.S. at 368. By way of factual background, on November 3, 1985, the victim, 
Harris Stone, was found dead in Danville, Virginia. State officials initially determined the cause of death 
to be blood alcohol poisoning. However, approximately six months after Stone’s death, defendant 
Williams drafted a letter to the police in which he admitted to murdering Stone, and on this basis, he 
was charged and convicted of the crime.  Id. at 367. 
 202. Id. at 368. 
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confession.203 After presenting this evidence, the prosecution presented two expert 
witnesses who testified that “there was a ‘high probability’ that Williams would 
pose a serious continuing threat to society.”204  
Thereafter, Williams’s defense counsel offered the testimony of his mother, 
two neighbors, and a taped excerpt by a psychiatrist, who stated that Williams had 
removed bullets from his gun during a robbery to prevent injury to the victims.205 
Williams’s defense counsel offered no other mitigating evidence. In addition, 
during defense counsel’s closing, counsel admitted that is was “difficult to find a 
reason why the jury should spare Williams’s life”:206 
I will admit too that it is very difficult to ask you to show mercy to a man who 
maybe has not shown much mercy himself.  . . . I doubt very seriously that he had 
mercy very highly on his mind when he was walking along West Green and the 
incident with Alberta Stroud. I doubt very seriously that he had mercy on his mind 
when he took two cars that didn’t belong to him. Admittedly it is very difficult to 
get us and ask that you give this man mercy when he has shown so little of it 
himself.207 
Not surprisingly, the jury sentenced Williams to death.208 The trial court 
subsequently determined that the death penalty was a “proper” and “just” 
sentence.209 Thereafter, Williams filed for state collateral relief, alleging that he 
was the victim of ineffective assistance of counsel.210 Specifically, Williams 
claimed that his trial counsel failed to investigate and present substantially 
                                                                                                     
 203. Id.  Specifically, the evidence introduced against Williams included: 
[T]he prosecution proved that Williams had been convicted of armed robbery in 1976 
and burglary and grand larceny in 1982. The prosecution also introduced the written 
confessions that Williams had made [regarding the murder] . . . .  The prosecution 
described two auto thefts and two separate violent assaults on elderly victims 
perpetrated after the Stone murder. On December 4, 1985, Williams had started a fire 
outside one victim’s residence before attacking and robbing him. On March 5, 1986, 
Williams had brutally assaulted an elderly woman on West Green Street—an incident 
he had mentioned in his letter to the police. That confession was particularly damaging 
because other evidence established that the woman was in a “vegetative state” and not 
expected to recover. Williams had also been convicted of arson for setting a fire in the 
jail while awaiting trial in this case.  
Id. at 368-69 (citations omitted).    
 204. Id. at 368-69.  
 205. Id. at 369. Additionally, Williams’s counsel’s performance during cross-examination of the 
prosecution’s witnesses included: 
Williams’ counsel repeatedly emphasized the fact that Williams had initiated the contact 
with the police that enabled them to solve the murder and to identify him as the 
perpetrator of the recent assaults, as well as the car thefts. In closing argument, 
Williams’ counsel characterized Williams’ confessional statements as “dumb,” but 
asked the jury to give weight to the fact that he had “turned himself in, not on one crime 
but on four . . .  that the [police otherwise] would not have solved.”  
Id.  
 206. Id. 
 207. Williams, 529 U.S. at 369 n.2. 
 208. Id. at 370. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase.211 This evidence included documents 
detailing Williams’s commitment when he was eleven years old “that dramatically 
described mistreatment, abuse, and neglect during his early childhood, as well as 
testimony that he was ‘borderline mentally retarded,’ had suffered repeated head 
injuries, and might have mental impairments organic in origin.”212 In addition, the 
same experts that testified on the prosecution’s behalf stated that Williams would 
not pose a danger to society if kept in a structured environment.213  
Based upon this evidence, the same judge who had sentenced Williams to 
death also found that Williams had been denied the effective assistance of counsel 
and ordered a new sentencing hearing.214 The Virginia Supreme Court, however, 
reversed the trial court, and Williams then sought relief in federal court, which 
reversed the Virginia Supreme Court and granted Williams’s petition.215 However, 
the Fourth Circuit later overruled the district court, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.216 
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and, for the first time in 
sixteen years, found that a defendant had been denied the right to effective 
assistance of counsel.217 In so holding, the Court began by explaining that “the 
merits of [the defendant’s] claim are squarely governed by our holding in 
Strickland v. Washington.”218 Accordingly, in stating that Strickland constituted 
“clearly established Federal law,”219 the Court held that Williams must first 
demonstrate that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that such performance prejudiced the defense.220 
In finding that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective, the 
Court relied almost exclusively on Strickland, and predicated its holding upon 
counsel’s failure to introduce critical mitigating evidence that would likely have 
influenced the jury’s decision at the penalty phase.221 The Court held: 
The record establishes that counsel did not begin to prepare for [the sentencing] 
                                                                                                     
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Williams, 529 U.S. at 371. 
 214. Id. at 370-71.  
 215. Id. at 372. 
 216. Id. at 374. 
 217. Id. at 398-99. 
 218. Id. at 390. 
 219. Williams, 529 U.S. at 391. 
 220. Id. at 390-91. 
 221. Id. at 395-99. The Court further stated:  
Of course, not all of the additional [mitigating] evidence was favorable to Williams. The 
juvenile records revealed that he had been thrice committed to the juvenile system—for 
aiding and abetting larceny when he was 11 years old, for pulling a false alarm when he 
was 12, and for breaking and entering when he was 15. But as the Federal District Court 
correctly observed, the failure to introduce the comparatively voluminous amount of 
evidence that did speak in Williams’ favor was not justified by a tactical decision to 
focus on Williams’ voluntary confession. Whether or not those omissions were 
sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of sentencing, they clearly 
demonstrate that trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough 
investigation of the defendant’s background. 
Id. at 396 (citations omitted). 
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phase of the proceeding until a week before the trial. They failed to conduct an 
investigation that would have uncovered extensive records graphically describing 
Williams’s nightmarish childhood, not because of any strategic calculation but 
because they incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records. Had 
they done so, the jury would have learned that Williams’s parents had been 
imprisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams and his siblings, that Williams had 
been severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had been committed to 
the custody of the social services bureau for two years during his parents’ 
incarceration (including one stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his 
parents were released from prison, had been returned to his parents’ custody.222 
The Court was also critical of Williams’s counsel because he “failed to introduce 
available evidence that Williams was ‘borderline mentally retarded’ and did not 
advance beyond the sixth grade in school.”223 In addition, the Court criticized 
counsel for failing to introduce evidence detailing “Williams’s commendations for 
helping crack a prison drug ring”224 or concerning “the testimony of prison officials 
who described Williams as among the inmates ‘least likely to act in a violent, 
dangerous or provocative way.’”225 As a result, relying in part upon ABA Standard 
4-4.1, the Court concluded that Williams’s counsel “did not fulfill their obligation 
to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”226 Based upon 
these and other omissions, the Court held that Williams had been denied the 
effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.227 
Critically, however, nothing in Williams indicated that the Court was reluctant 
to apply Strickland or willing to modify its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. In 
fact, the opposite is true, as the Court explained that its decision was “squarely 
governed”228 by Strickland, which it characterized as “clearly established Federal 
law.”229 Furthermore, although the Court did cite to the ABA Guidelines in parts of 
its holding, not one sentence in its decision even suggested that the Guidelines were 
to play a role any more significant than Strickland originally contemplated—as 
                                                                                                     
 222. Id. at 395 (citations omitted). 
 223. Id. at 396 (citations omitted). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Williams, 529 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted).  
 226. Id. at 396.  
 227. Id. at 399.  Specifically, the Court held that Williams was prejudiced by the failure of his 
attorneys to investigate and present the powerful mitigating evidence concerning his character and 
background: 
We are also persuaded, unlike the Virginia Supreme Court, that counsel’s 
unprofessional service prejudiced Williams within the meaning of Strickland. After 
hearing the additional evidence developed in the postconviction proceedings, the very 
judge who presided at Williams’ trial, and who once determined that the death penalty 
was “just” and “appropriate,” concluded that there existed a “reasonable probability that 
the result of the sentencing phase would have been different” if the jury had heard that 
evidence. . . .  Judge Ingram did stress the importance of mitigation evidence in making 
his “outcome determination,” but it is clear that his predictive judgment rested on his 
assessment of the totality of the omitted evidence rather than on the notion that a single 
item of omitted evidence, no matter how trivial, would require a new hearing.  
Id. at 396-97. 
 228. Id. at 390. 
 229. Id. at 391. 
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guides rather than benchmarks.230 The core of the Williams holding was based not 
upon the enunciation or implementation of a new standard, but upon the 
recognition that Williams’s lawyer had failed in nearly every respect to present 
mitigating evidence that likely would have spared his client the penalty of death.  
B.  Wiggins v. Smith 
In Wiggins, the defendant was convicted of capital murder by a Maryland 
judge and sentenced to death by a jury.231 The defendant’s trial counsel moved to 
bifurcate the sentencing hearing, in which they would first argue that Wiggins was 
not principally responsible for the victim’s death and, if necessary, present a 
mitigation case.232 The court subsequently denied this motion, and at the sentencing 
phase Wiggins’s attorneys re-asserted his innocence yet offered no mitigating 
evidence whatsoever.233 Indeed, while counsel told the jury in her opening 
statements that it would hear evidence concerning “Wiggins’s difficult life,”234 
such evidence was never introduced. The jury ultimately sentenced Wiggins to 
death.235 
Thereafter, Wiggins sought post-conviction relief, arguing that “his trial 
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present 
mitigating evidence of his dysfunctional background.”236 Specifically, Wiggins 
presented evidence by a forensic social worker concerning “the severe physical and 
sexual abuse he had suffered at the hands of his mother and while under the care of 
a series of foster parents.”237 Both the trial court and state court of appeals denied 
Wiggins’s motion, but the federal district court granted Wiggins’s habeas 
petition.238 The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding “trial counsel’s strategic decision 
to focus on Wiggins’s direct responsibility to be reasonable.”239 
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and held that Wiggins’s 
                                                                                                     
 230. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
 231. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515-16. 
 232. Id. at 515. 
 233. Id. at 515-16. 
 234. Id. at 515. Specifically, the record reveals the following regarding trial counsel’s conduct at 
sentencing: 
On October 12, the court denied the bifurcation motion, and sentencing proceedings 
commenced immediately thereafter. In her opening statement, Nethercott [defense 
counsel] told the jurors they would hear evidence suggesting that someone other than 
Wiggins actually killed [the victim]. Counsel then explained that the judge would 
instruct them to weigh Wiggins’ clean record as a factor against a death sentence. She 
concluded: “You’re going to hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life. It has not 
been easy for him. But he’s worked. He’s tried to be a productive citizen, and he’s 
reached the age of 27 with no conviction for prior crimes of violence and no 
convictions, period. . . .  I think that’s an important thing for you to consider.” During 
the proceedings themselves, however, counsel introduced no evidence of Wiggins’ life 
history.  
Id.  (citations omitted). 
 235. Id. at 516. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 516. 
 238. Id. at 517-18. 
 239. Id. at 519. 
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counsel had been constitutionally ineffective.240 In so holding, the Court again 
began its analysis by setting forth the “established . . . legal principles that govern 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,” namely, the two-pronged Strickland 
test.241 Furthermore, at the outset the Court specifically stated that “[w]e have 
declined to articulate specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct and 
instead have emphasized that ‘[t]he proper measure of attorney performance 
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’”242 
The Court’s finding of ineffectiveness was based primarily upon the fact that 
counsel failed to present critical mitigating evidence that would likely have 
affected the outcome of the sentencing phase.243 Put differently, trial counsel’s 
decision to limit their investigation into various potential sources of mitigating 
evidence was not objectively reasonable and ultimately prejudiced the defendant.244 
For example, the record demonstrated that counsel’s investigation produced 
information from three sources.245  First, a psychologist conducted certain tests on 
the defendant, Wiggins, which revealed that he had an IQ of seventy-nine and 
“exhibited features of a personality disorder.”246 In addition, the pre-sentence 
investigation report contained Wiggins’s own description of his youth as 
“disgusting,” while noting that he spent most of his life in foster care.247 Counsel’s 
final source of information was certain records kept by the Baltimore City 
Department of Social Services, which documented Wiggins’s placement in various 
foster homes throughout his childhood.248 Ultimately, counsel decided not to 
expand their investigation beyond this information and focused their efforts during 
the sentencing phase to re-arguing the issue of Wiggins’s responsibility for the 
murder.249 
It was counsel’s failure to probe further into Wiggins’s background that 
                                                                                                     
 240. Id. at 534-38. 
 241. Id. at 521. 
 242. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 
 243. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534-35. 
 244. Id.  
 245. Id. at 523. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. 
 249. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 526. Specifically, the Court found that counsel’s decision to limit their 
investigation to the pre-sentencing report and records kept by the Department of Social Services was 
constitutionally defective: 
[S]tandard practice in Maryland in capital cases at the time of Wiggins’ trial included 
the preparation of a social history report. Despite the fact that the Public Defender’s 
office made funds available for the retention of a forensic social worker, counsel chose 
not to commission such a report. Counsel’s conduct similarly fell short of the standards 
for capital defense work articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA)—
standards to which we have long referred as “guides to determining what is reasonable.” 
The ABA Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating evidence “should 
comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence 
to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.” Despite 
these well-defined norms, however, counsel abandoned their investigation of 
petitioner’s background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his 
history from a narrow set of sources.  
Id. at 524 (citations omitted). 
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formed the basis for the Court’s finding of ineffective assistance.250 First, the Court 
noted that the information that counsel initially discovered in the social service 
records should have prompted further inquiries rather than halt the investigation 
altogether.251 Indeed, the social service records revealed that Wiggins’s mother was 
a chronic alcoholic; that he was transferred to various foster homes throughout his 
childhood, often experiencing emotional difficulties; that he had frequent absences 
from school; and that “his mother [often] left him and his siblings alone for days 
without food.”252  
The Court explained that if counsel had conducted a proper investigation, they 
would have uncovered the following facts: 
Wiggins experienced severe privation and abuse in the first six years of his life 
while in the custody of his alcoholic, abusive mother. He suffered physical 
torment, sexual molestation, and repeated rape during his subsequent years in 
foster care. [According to the Court] [t]he time Wiggins spent homeless, along 
with his diminished mental capacities . . . further augment his mitigation case.253 
Furthermore, the Court noted that it was particularly egregious for trial counsel to 
instruct the jury during the sentencing phase that it would hear evidence concerning 
Wiggins’s “difficult life,”254 yet never ultimately present any evidence of this 
“difficult life.”255  
Importantly, in Wiggins, as in Williams, the Court made no suggestion, 
implicitly or explicitly, that it was modifying or otherwise reassessing the viability 
of Strickland. In fact, the opposite is true. Yet again, the Court specifically 
“declined to articulate specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct,”256 and 
while it did rely upon the ABA Standards in its opinion, it specifically referred to 
                                                                                                     
 250. Id. at 524-25. 
 251. Id. at 525. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 535. 
 254. Id. at 526. 
 255. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 526. In fact, with respect to this issue, the Court stated: 
The record of the actual sentencing proceedings underscores the unreasonableness of 
counsel’s conduct by suggesting that their failure to investigate thoroughly resulted 
from inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment . . . during the sentencing proceeding 
itself, counsel did not focus exclusively on Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the 
murder. After introducing that issue in her opening statement, Nethercott entreated the 
jury to consider not just what Wiggins “is found to have done,” but also “who [he] is.” 
Though she told the jury it would “hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life,” 
counsel never followed up on that suggestion with details of Wiggins’ history. At the 
same time, counsel called a criminologist to testify that inmates serving life sentences 
tend to adjust well and refrain from further violence in prison-testimony with no bearing 
on whether petitioner committed the murder by his own hand. Far from focusing 
exclusively on petitioner’s direct responsibility, then, counsel put on a half-hearted 
mitigation case, taking precisely the type of “shotgun” approach the Maryland Court of 
Appeals concluded counsel sought to avoid. When viewed in this light, the “strategic 
decision” the state courts and respondents all invoke to justify counsel’s limited pursuit 
of mitigating evidence resembles more [of] a post hoc rationalization of counsel’s 
conduct rather than an accurate description of their deliberations prior to sentencing.  
Id. at 526-27 (citations omitted). 
 256. Id. at 521. 
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them, in the context of Strickland, as “standards to which we long have referred as 
‘guides to determining what is reasonable.’”257 The Court was not breaking new 
ground in Wiggins. It was simply recognizing and condemning one egregious case 
of attorney incompetence.  
C . Rompilla v. Beard 
In Rompilla, the defendant was convicted of murder.258 During the penalty 
phase, the prosecutor sought to prove several aggravating factors to justify a death 
sentence, one of which was that “Rompilla had a significant history of felony 
convictions indicating the use or threat of violence.”259 The prosecutor presented 
evidence on all three of these factors and the jury found all of them proven.260 In 
response, Rompilla’s counsel presented a mitigation case that consisted of five 
family members that argued for “residual doubt”261 (which appeals to lingering 
doubts about the defendant’s guilt) and asked the jury for mercy, “saying [that] 
they believed Rompilla was innocent and a good man.”262 Ultimately, the jury 
sentenced Rompilla to death.263  
Subsequently, Rompilla sought post-conviction relief in which he alleged that 
his counsel’s performance was ineffective “in failing to present significant 
mitigating evidence about Rompilla’s childhood, mental capacities and health, and 
alcoholism.”264 The state court, as well as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
denied Rompilla’s request.265 However, the federal district court granted 
Rompilla’s claim, holding that his counsel had been ineffective in failing to 
investigate “‘pretty obvious signs’ that Rompilla had a troubled childhood and 
suffered from mental illness and alcoholism.”266 On appeal, the Third Circuit 
reversed, finding that counsel’s investigation into mitigating evidence, which 
consisted of interviewing Rompilla and certain family members, as well as 
consultations with three mental health experts, was constitutionally sufficient.267 
                                                                                                     
 257. Id. at 524. 
 258. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 377-78. 
 259. Id. at 378. The other two aggravating factors were that: (1) the murder was committed in the 
course of another felony; and (2) the murder was committed by torture.  Id. 
 260. Id.  
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. Specifically, “Rompilla’s 14-year-old son testified that he loved his father and would visit 
him in prison.” Id. While the jury found “in mitigation, that Rompilla’s son had testified on his behalf 
and that rehabilitation was possible,” they “assigned the greater weight to the aggravating factors” and 
thus sentenced Rompilla to death.  Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 378. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 379. 
 267. Id. The Supreme Court summarized the Third Circuit’s reasoning: 
 The majority found nothing unreasonable in the state court’s application of 
Strickland, given defense counsel’s efforts to uncover mitigation material, which 
included interviewing Rompilla and certain family members, as well as consultation 
with three mental health experts. Although the majority noted that the lawyers did not 
unearth the “useful information” to be found in Rompilla’s” school, medical, police and 
prison records,” it thought the lawyers were justified in failing to hunt through these 
records when their other efforts gave [them] no reason to believe the search would yield 
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Rompilla was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel.268 The Court commenced its analysis by re-asserting 
Strickland’s governing legal principles, and noting that “hindsight is discounted by 
pegging adequacy to ‘counsel’s perspective at the time’ investigative decisions are 
made, and by giving a ‘heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.’”269 
The Court first observed that trial counsel’s only sources of mitigation were 
Rompilla himself, five members of his family, and three mental health witnesses 
who examined Rompilla prior to the sentencing phase.270 Thereafter, the Court 
delineated several additional avenues that Rompilla’s counsel could have pursued 
to “cast light” on his mental condition or otherwise discover additional mitigating 
evidence.271 For example, the Court noted that counsel could have searched school 
records and information regarding juvenile and adult incarcerations.272 Importantly, 
however, the Court followed Strickland’s mandate that the failure to pursue these 
lines of inquiry was not tantamount to ineffective assistance because trial counsel 
was not required to “scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up.”273 
Critically, however, the Court found that counsel’s performance was 
constitutionally infirm because Rompilla’s lawyers failed to examine the file 
containing the prior convictions upon which the prosecution relied in proving one 
of its aggravating factors.274 The Court cited various reasons in support of its 
finding, first that “[c]ounsel knew that the Commonwealth intended to seek the 
death penalty by proving Rompilla had a significant history of felony convictions 
indicating the use or threat of violence, an aggravator under state law.”275 Counsel 
also knew that the prosecution would specify his “prior conviction for rape and 
assault, and would emphasize his violent character by introducing a transcript of 
the rape victim’s testimony given in [his] earlier trial.”276 The Court, therefore, 
found it unreasonable for counsel to not even examine the information that the 
prosecution planned to present in support of its argument in favor of the death 
                                                                                                     
anything helpful. The panel thus distinguished Rompilla’s case from Wiggins v. Smith.  
Whereas Wiggins’s counsel failed to investigate adequately, to the point even of 
ignoring the leads their limited enquiry yielded, the Court of Appeals saw the Rompilla 
investigation as going far enough to leave counsel with reason for thinking further 
efforts would not be a wise use of the limited resources they had. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 268. Id. at 380. 
 269. Id. at 381 (citations omitted). 
 270. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381-82. 
 271. Id. at 382. 
 272. Id. The Court also stated: 
And while counsel knew from police reports provided in pretrial discovery that 
Rompilla had been drinking heavily at the time of his offense . . . and although one of 
the mental health experts reported that Rompilla’s troubles with alcohol merited further 
investigation, counsel did not look for evidence of a history of dependence on alcohol 
that might have extenuating significance. 
Id. 
 273. Id. at 383. With respect to these issues, the Court explained that “reasonably diligent counsel 
may draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste.”  Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383. 
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penalty.277 As the Court stated: 
[I]t is difficult to see how counsel could have failed to realize that without 
examining the readily available file they were seriously compromising their 
opportunity to respond to a case for aggravation. The prosecution was going to use 
the dramatic facts of a similar prior offense, and Rompilla’s counsel had a duty to 
make all reasonable efforts to learn what they could about the offense. Reasonable 
efforts certainly included obtaining the Commonwealth’s own readily available 
file on the prior conviction to learn what the Commonwealth knew about the 
crime, to discover any mitigating evidence the Commonwealth would downplay, 
and to anticipate the details of the aggravating evidence the Commonwealth would 
emphasize. Without making reasonable efforts to review the file, defense counsel 
could have had no hope of knowing whether the prosecution was quoting 
selectively from the transcript, or whether there were circumstances extenuating 
the behavior described by the victim.278 
Moreover, as the Court recognized, “[t]he obligation to get the file was particularly 
pressing here owing to the similarity of the violent prior offense to the crime 
charged and Rompilla’s sentencing strategy stressing residual doubt.”279 Indeed, 
“[w]ithout making efforts to learn the details and rebut the relevance of the earlier 
crime, a convincing argument for residual doubt was certainly beyond any 
hope.”280 
In addition, the Court found trial counsel’s performance to be prejudicial 
because, had the prior conviction file been consulted, then valuable mitigation 
evidence could have been uncovered that could have been presented at the penalty 
phase.281 As the Court stated, “[I]f the defense lawyers had looked in the file on 
Rompilla’s prior conviction, it is uncontested they would have found a range of 
mitigation leads that no other source had opened up.”282 For example, the files 
contained records of “Rompilla’s prior imprisonment,” and “pictured Rompilla’s 
childhood and mental health very differently from anything defense counsel had 
seen or heard.”283 A file also contained an evaluation by a corrections officer that 
                                                                                                     
 277. Id. at 385-86. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 386. 
 280. Id. The Court also stated: 
Nor is there any merit to the United States’ contention that further enquiry into the prior 
conviction file would have been fruitless because the sole reason the transcript was 
being introduced was to establish the aggravator that Rompilla had committed prior 
violent felonies. The Government maintains that because the transcript would 
incontrovertibly establish the fact that Rompilla had committed a violent felony, the 
defense could not have expected to rebut that aggravator through further investigation of 
the file. That analysis ignores the fact that the sentencing jury was required to weigh 
aggravating factors against mitigating factors. We may reasonably assume that the jury 
could give more relative weight to a prior violent felony aggravator where defense 
counsel missed an opportunity to argue that [the] circumstances of the prior conviction 
were less damning than the prosecution’s characterization of the conviction would 
suggest. 
Id. at 386 n.4 (citations omitted). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390. 
 283. Id. 
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Rompilla was “reared in the slum environment of Allentown, Pa. . . . quit school at 
16,” and had a series of incarcerations  “related to over-indulgence in alcoholic 
beverages.”284 In addition, the prior conviction file revealed “test results that the 
defense’s mental health experts would have viewed as pointing to schizophrenia 
and other disorders, and test scores showing a third grade level of cognition after 
nine years of schooling.”285 
Indeed, “[t]he accumulated entries [in the prior conviction file] would have 
destroyed the benign conception of Rompilla’s upbringing and mental capacity 
defense counsel had formed from talking with Rompilla himself and some of his 
family members.”286 The entries likely would have led to further investigative 
efforts, which would have uncovered that Rompilla’s “parents were both severe 
alcoholics who drank constantly.”287 Furthermore, Rompilla “was abused by his 
father, who beat him when he was young with his hands, fists, leather straps, belts 
and sticks.”288 Rompilla also suffered from “organic brain damage, an extreme 
mental disturbance significantly impairing several of his cognitive functions.”289 
Ultimately, therefore, had counsel conducted his investigative efforts in an 
objectively reasonable manner, the evidence would have amounted to “a mitigation 
case that bears no relation to the few naked pleas for mercy actually put before the 
jury . . . .”290 Based upon the totality of all these factors, the Court held that 
Rompilla had been denied the right to effective assistance of counsel.291  
Consequently, Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla are less about the Court 
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 286. Id.  The Court further explained: 
With this information, counsel would have become skeptical of the impression given by 
the five family members and would unquestionably have gone further to build a 
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postconviction counsel found, including testimony from several members of Rompilla’s 
family. 
Id.  
In addition, as specifically summarized, by a dissenting judge on the Third Circuit: 
Rompilla’s parents were both severe alcoholics who drank constantly. His mother drank 
during her pregnancy with Rompilla, and he and his brothers eventually developed 
serious drinking problems. His father, who had a vicious temper, frequently beat 
Rompilla’s mother, leaving her bruised and black-eyed, and bragged about his cheating 
on her. His parents fought violently, and on at least one occasion his mother stabbed his 
father. He was abused by his father who beat him when he was young with his hands, 
fists, leather straps, belts and sticks. All of the children lived in terror. There were no 
expressions of parental love, affection or approval. Instead, he was subjected to yelling 
and verbal abuse. His father locked Rompilla and his brother Richard in a small wire 
mesh dog pen that was filthy and excrement filled. He had an isolated background, and 
was not allowed to visit other children or to speak to anyone on the phone. They had no 
indoor plumbing in the house, he slept in the attic with no heat, and the children were 
not given clothes and attended school in rags.  
Id. at 391-92 (quoting Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 279 (Sloviter, C. J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted)).  
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doctrinally altering its approach and more about its recognition of instances of truly 
substandard representation where the defendant’s life was at stake. Nowhere in 
these opinions did the Court intimate that Strickland was no longer the governing 
law with respect to its analysis concerning ineffective assistance claims. In fact, in 
each of these cases, the Court began its opinion by re-stating the two-pronged test 
that defendants must satisfy in order to succeed in demonstrating a Sixth 
Amendment violation. Furthermore, although the Court did rely to varying degrees 
upon the ABA’s Guidelines, it was careful to note that these were only guides to its 
analysis, not mandatory rules or benchmarks against which counsel’s performance 
would be scrutinized. In fact, in Wiggins, the Court specifically rejected the use of 
specific guidelines, holding that “[w]e have declined to articulate specific 
guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct and instead have emphasized that ‘[t]he 
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under 
prevailing professional norms.’”292  
Thus, the Court’s decisions in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla do not reflect a 
fundamental “jurisprudential shift”293 in the Court’s ineffective assistance analysis, 
but instead represent a reaction to truly sub-standard lawyering that prejudiced the 
defendants in each case. Put another way, these cases are notable more for the facts 
upon which they are based rather than any fundamental change in the governing 
legal principles that are applied. Strickland remains good law, and defendants 
continue to face an uphill battle in proving that trial counsel’s performance 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In fact, recent statistics underscore that Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla have 
had, if anything, only a modest impact upon the success of ineffective assistance 
claims brought in state and federal courts.294 For example, as stated above, from 
1994 through 2000, only thirty-four ineffective assistance claims brought by capital 
defendants at the state level were successful.295 In the six years following Williams, 
and during the period in which Wiggins and Rompilla were decided, this number 
increased to only forty-seven, as capital defendants continued to face courts that 
were hostile to their ineffective assistance claims.296 Furthermore, at the federal 
level, from 1994 through 2000, only thirty-two ineffective assistance claims 
brought by capital defendants were successful.297 During the six years following 
Williams, and during the time that Wiggins and Rompilla were decided, courts 
remained reluctant to grant relief to defendants claiming ineffective assistance, as 
only forty-seven claims navigated safely though Strickland’s  two-pronged 
standard.298 This can no more be characterized as a “jurisprudential shift”299 than 
can the Court’s decisions be summarized as a shift toward the guidelines approach 
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“once hailed by Judge Bazelon.”300  
The truth is that such claims of a perceived shift are overstated. In fact, 
Professor Neumann acknowledges that “a number of courts still remain hostile to 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and are still willing to put a stamp of 
approval on appallingly inadequate representation.”301 For example, as Professor 
Neumann notes, since Williams, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has found 
ineffective assistance in only one case.302 As Professor Neumann notes, “Some of 
the cases affirmed by that court involved truly abysmal representation.”303 Indeed, 
the Court denied an ineffective assistance claim where defense counsel failed to 
present evidence “that the defendant . . . had ingested large amounts of a strong 
psychoactive drug known to increase aggressive tendencies . . . along with other 
narcotics and alcohol . . . at the time of the offense.”304 In addition, defense counsel 
failed to present mitigation evidence “regarding the severe physical, emotional, and 
sexual abuse the defendant endured as a child . . . at the hands of his grandparents . 
. . and the sexual abuse his mother inflicted upon him.”305 Despite this evidence, 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, after Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla had 
been decided, denied this defendant’s ineffective assistance claim.306 
Professor Neumann also recognizes that the Fifth Circuit continues to routinely 
reject claims of ineffective assistance “in spite of strong evidence of attorney 
incompetence.”307 For example, Professor Neumann cites one case where a 
defendant’s trial counsel failed to present any mitigating evidence whatsoever, 
despite evidence that the defendant “suffered from a chronic brain injury stemming 
from an accident during his childhood”308 and “subsequent impaired intellectual 
functioning.”309 In addition, counsel failed to present “testimony from his mother, 
half-sister, aunt, and cousin regarding their love for defendant,”310 and the fact that 
“he was young and intoxicated when he committed the murder and was extremely 
remorseful.”311 Despite counsel’s failure to present any mitigating evidence, the 
court denied the defendant’s ineffective assistance claim, holding that such tactics 
constituted reasonable “strategic” decisions under Strickland.312 
Professor Neumann contends, however, “[t]he worst offender . . . is the Fourth 
Circuit.”313 Specifically, “[i]t has repudiated every single ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim raised by a death-sentenced inmate after Williams.”314 Amazingly, in 
one case the court denied an ineffective assistance claim “despite the court’s 
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acknowledgement that the bulk of counsel’s work in preparation for mitigation 
occurred during the week that he was also participating in the guilt phase of the 
trial and handling his partnership’s IRS difficulties, and that counsel’s ‘efforts were 
certainly less than optimal.’”315 In fact, counsel had “attempted to withdraw . . . 
‘when it became clear that his partnership’s financial difficulties would 
unacceptably interfere with his representation, but the state court denied his 
motion.’”316  
In further underscoring the limits of Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, 
Professor Neumann acknowledges that the Supreme Court’s nod to the ABA 
Standards “is only relevant to the performance component of ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims.”317 As Professor Neumann observes, “Strickland’s prejudice 
prong, which requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, is 
also badly in need of modification.”318 Indeed, as Professor Neumann notes, until 
further reforms are implemented, “ineffective assistance of counsel claims will still 
be difficult to win.”319  
Consequently, courts at both the state and federal level continue to allow an 
appallingly substandard level of representation to persist without remedy. Although 
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla are commendable for addressing situations of 
blatantly incompetent representation, they do not represent a jurisprudential shift in 
the Court’s approach to ineffective assistance adjudication. Instead, much of what 
has happened post-Rompilla resembles what has happened post-Strickland:  Trial 
counsel are failing to present substantial and credible mitigating evidence, often 
pertaining to social histories revealing a defendant’s severe physical, emotional, 
and sexual abuse, as well as legitimate medical histories detailing organic brain 
damage, psychiatric illnesses, and personality disorders. Despite these glaring 
failures, state and federal courts continue to reject defendants’ claims of ineffective 
assistance, labeling such calculations as permissible strategic decisions, or, even if 
objectively unreasonable, insufficient to affect the outcome under Strickland’s 
prejudice prong. The effect of these rulings is a capital sentencing system that 
continues to tolerate incompetent performance by counsel. Williams, Wiggins, and 
Rompilla did not effectuate systemic change. They merely signaled that the Court 
was not going to tolerate obvious examples where attorneys had failed their clients 
in life-and-death situations. 
Systemic change, however, is exactly what is needed if the concept of 
“effective” assistance is to become a reality for all criminal defendants, particularly 
those against whom the death penalty is sought. As set forth below, this Article 
proposes systemic change on the following four fronts, aimed directly at improving 
the quality of legal representation: (1) the establishment of a Death Penalty 
Representation Commission in each state, responsible for the promulgation of 
specific and detailed guidelines that will direct trial counsel’s performance at the 
sentencing phase of a capital case; (2) the contemplation of a more active trial 
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court, which will be responsible, in various ways and through several means, for 
ensuring adherence to the guidelines and representation that complies with 
reasonable standards of professional competence; (3) substantive and meaningful 
appellate review; and (4) elimination of Strickland’s prejudice requirement, while 
retaining the “objectively reasonable” prong, with burden-shifting provisions 
implemented depending upon defense counsel’s compliance with the relevant 
guidelines.  
This will ensure that the “objectively reasonable” analysis is applied in an 
equitable manner, to reflect counsel’s actual performance at trial, demonstrated by 
his compliance with specific guidelines that enumerate particular duties pertaining 
to the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence. Critically, the 
following section will focus solely on the sentencing phase because, as discussed 
above, counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence is the most 
common ground upon which ineffective assistance of counsel claims are based.  
IV.  SYSTEMIC CHANGE TO ADJUDICATING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
CLAIMS: A NEW “GUIDELINE” APPROACH THAT IS CONNECTED TO A  
PRESUMPTION-BASED “REASONABLENESS” ANALYSIS 
This Article focuses upon the sentencing phase of capital trials because “many 
capital defendants get no meaningful support at the sentencing phase. . . .  [F]or this 
reason, claims of ineffectiveness at the penalty phase are among the most common 
issues raised in habeas corpus petitions by inmates on death row.”320  
As a threshold matter, the systemic change proposed here involves the 
following: (1) the formation of a Death Penalty Representation Commission in 
each state that is responsible for researching, drafting, and developing specific 
guidelines pertaining to the representation of defendants at the sentencing phase of 
capital trials; (2) the compilation of detailed guidelines concerning trial counsel’s 
performance at the sentencing phase, particularly as it relates to the investigation 
and presentation of mitigating evidence; (3) the emphasis upon an active trial court, 
which is responsible both for ensuring compliance with the guidelines and ordering 
corrective measures where potential instances of incompetent representation are 
identified; and (4) an elimination of Strickland’s prejudice requirement on appellate 
review, in favor of a burden-shifting “reasonableness” analysis that is based upon 
counsel’s compliance with these standards and overall performance at the 
underlying trial.   
The necessity for such guidelines is motivated by three primary factors.  First, 
at the sentencing phase in a capital trial, the defendant’s life is at stake, and thus the 
necessity to present skillfully all relevant evidence relating to the defendant’s 
background and character could not be more pressing. Indeed, “[a]t the penalty 
phase of a capital case, the central issue . . . is the highly-charged moral and 
emotional issue of whether the defendant . . . is a person who should continue to 
live.”321 Thus, at this stage, “it is imperative that all relevant mitigating information 
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be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.”322 “Relevant 
mitigating information” is that which “casts [defendants] in a more sympathetic 
light.”323  
Second, as a practical matter, although many commentators have advocated for 
modifications to the manner in which attorneys are appointed to represent capital 
defendants, the truth remains that “approximately ninety percent of capital 
defendants are indigent”324 and thus receive the services of each state’s public 
defender system. Of course, while “some indigent defendants are appointed quite 
competent counsel,”325 in states “that do not adequately fund or train public 
defenders, ‘[t]oo often, assistance of counsel for the poor can be like getting brain 
surgery from a podiatrist.’”326 As a result, “[w]ithout proper representation, the 
current standards adopted by the Supreme Court [in Strickland] allow indigent 
defendants . . . to be killed by the state with minimal protection.”327  For this 
reason, the establishment of guidelines can, at the very least, contribute to 
improving the quality of legal representation for those defendants who rely upon 
attorneys provided by the states. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the presentation of mitigating evidence 
at the penalty phase is a highly complex endeavor that requires the skill and 
participation of professionals from a variety of fields and with varying expertise.328  
Indeed, because a jury is constitutionally permitted to consider “all relevant 
mitigating evidence”329 when rendering a life decision, mitigating factors include 
matters such as “family history; youthfulness; underdeveloped intellect and 
maturity; favorable prospects for rehabilitation; poverty; military service; 
cooperation with authorities; character; prior criminal history; mental capacity; 
[and] age.”330 In this way, “[t]he Court’s limitless rule with respect to mitigation 
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evidence enables defense counsel to construct a comprehensive, illustrative, and 
life-saving social history of capital defendants.”331 This social history “cannot be 
stressed enough”332 because “[w]hen determining whether to sentence an individual 
to death, jurors often yearn for meaningful explanations of why the capital violence 
resulted in the first place.”333  
Critically, however, while “[t]he importance of social histories is obvious,”334 
identifying the “most relevant aspects of the defendant’s life and the onset age of 
such an investigation are not as evident.”335 Indeed, after a discussion of the 
“necessary elements that counsel must consider when developing a mitigation 
strategy . . . defense counsel, psychologists, and psychiatrists . . . realize the 
enormity of mitigation investigations.”336 Thus, for these three reasons—the stakes, 
likely inexperience of defense counsel, and complexity of mitigation evidence—the 
development of specific guidelines during the penalty phase could not be more 
vital.  
A.  The Establishment of a Death Penalty Representation Commission 
At the outset, the success of any guidelines-driven system depends upon the 
quality of its drafters. As a result, this Article proposes that each state should 
develop a Death Penalty Representation Commission (“Commission”), comprised 
of attorneys, judges, scholars, and commentators with intimate familiarity of the 
processes relating to death penalty representation in the state within which such 
guidelines will be promulgated. Importantly, before enunciating specific 
guidelines, the Commission should conduct in-depth research with the purpose of 
identifying each capital case, over the previous ten-year period, that was prosecuted 
in that particular state. In so doing, the Commission should analyze in detail the 
specific arguments made by both the prosecution and the defense during the 
penalty phase, with particular emphasis upon the evidence that the defense adduced 
to mitigate the defendant’s culpability.  The Commission should study both the 
type of evidence that was produced, along with the manner in which it was 
introduced. In addition, the Commission should identify the frequency with which 
experts were used, including psychologists, social workers, and psychiatrists, along 
with other evidence that tended to be offered in an attempt to spare the defendant’s 
life.  
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The Commission should also assess the frequency with which family histories, 
medical histories, educational histories, and other relevant data were used, and 
detail the emphasis that defense attorneys customarily place upon each piece of 
mitigating evidence. The Commission should also study the many cases in which 
defense counsel elected not to pursue a mitigation strategy and examine the reasons 
underlying such decisions as set forth in the record. From this data, the 
Commission should look at each jury’s verdict in every case, and, using this 
information, the Commission should seek to discern a pattern or patterns that 
indicate the types and kind of mitigation evidence that was most effective and 
influential. From this research the Commission will be able to develop two sets of 
information.  First, it will be able to “rank” or identify for attorneys litigating 
capital cases the specific mitigating evidence most commonly used by defense 
attorneys at the sentencing phase. Second, the Commission will be able to set forth 
in the same manner the type of evidence that has been found to be most influential 
or favorable to the defendant. While this will serve as a preliminary guide for trial 
counsel, the most important role of this research is that it will allow the 
Commission to promulgate informed, detailed, and purpose-driven guidelines.  
1.  The Commission’s Specific Guidelines 
The Commission’s guidelines should be specific and endeavor to assist 
counsel in both investigating and preparing the most effective mitigation defense 
possible. In other words, the guidelines should serve to assist counsel in identifying 
the sources of potentially mitigating evidence, the specific experts—social workers 
and psychologists—who can assist counsel in organizing, presenting, and testifying 
concerning such evidence, and the best methods by which to present such evidence 
to a jury. The guidelines should therefore operate to assist the attorney in putting 
forth the most persuasive mitigation defense possible, consistent with trial 
counsel’s role to present his client in the most sympathetic—and truthful—light 
possible to the sentencing jury.  
Having said that, the guidelines should be drafted in a check-list format that 
specifically identifies each aspect of the defendant’s background that the attorney is 
required to investigate and, correspondingly, all experts with whom the attorney is 
required to consult. Against this conceptual backdrop, each Death Penalty 
Representation Commission will be responsible for drafting detailed guidelines that 
focus upon counsel’s duty to investigate and present a compelling social history in 
mitigation of their client’s culpability. The following represents a substantial 
portion of the specific points that the guidelines should encompass in their initial 
renditions. 
a.  Medical History 
Counsel for every capital defendant should be required to investigate his 
client’s medical history.  Indeed, “[t]he defendant’s medical history is crucial 
because most jurors find medical reasons for capital violence easier to accept and 
understand than many other forms of mitigating evidence.”337 As one Commentator 
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notes: 
Counsel should determine whether the defendant suffers from any neurological 
defects or whether the defendant experienced birth complications. Then, counsel 
should determine whether the defendant has ever been exposed to toxins or 
whether the defendant suffers from chronic illnesses. Finally, counsel should 
determine whether the defendant was genetically endowed with a violent-prone 
personality, whether the defendant has been diagnosed with brain impairments, 
whether the defendant suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome, or whether the 
defendant is mentally retarded. Due to the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in 
Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, mental retardation and youthfulness 
(offenders under the age of eighteen) are categorical bars to the death penalty.338  
As a result, an investigation in the defendant’s medical history will be an important 
aspect of any guideline system, due to its potential to produce highly relevant 
mitigating evidence. 
b.  Psychiatric Disabilities 
Critically, given “the high population of mentally impaired individuals on 
death row, it is imperative that defense counsel explore whether defendants have 
psychiatric disabilities.”339 As one Commentator notes, to “competently 
investigate, accumulate, and present psychiatric evidence, defense counsel must (1) 
appreciate the myriad of mental health issues relevant to criminal cases, (2) be 
familiar with the various symptoms that defendants may exhibit, and (3) be aware 
of the different diagnostic processes of psychologists and psychiatrists.”340 
Likewise, “[s]pecialized attention must be channeled to ascertain whether the 
defendant suffers from severe depression, postpartum depression, sleep disorders, 
or a chemical dependency.”341  
Additionally, trial counsel should “determine whether the defendant’s 
intellectual functioning is impaired, whether the defendant suffers from epilepsy, 
and whether the defendant was physically or sexually abused as a child.”342 With 
respect to the issue of abuse, whether physical or sexual, “the jury must be 
provided with concrete illustrations of the abuse so that it may understand its 
general and long-term effects.”343 Lastly, efforts should be made to “determine 
whether the defendant has ever attempted suicide, or . . . exhibit[ed] psychopathic 
or anti-social personality traits.”344 
Importantly, to obtain this information, defense counsel must investigate a 
variety of sources. Such sources include the “defendant’s family members; the 
defendant’s former schools (i.e., elementary, middle, high school, trade schools, 
and colleges); the defendant’s military institution(s), juvenile court and prison 
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records; and the defendant’s medical and psychiatric records.”345  
c.  Drug and Alcohol Addiction 
Not surprisingly, “the defendant’s drug and alcohol history must be thoroughly 
assessed.”346 Trial counsel must also investigate whether the defendant was under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offense.347 In doing so, trial 
counsel should: (1) consult with individuals who were with the defendant on the 
day that the alleged crime occurred; (2) analyze the crime scene evidence; (3) 
“review the post-arrest medical records; and (4) ‘talk to as many eyewitnesses as 
possible.’”348 If evidence of an addiction is discovered, “defense counsel must then 
consult with medical [and] psychiatric experts to determine how the addiction [or] 
intoxication may have affected the defendant’s behavior on the day the capital 
violence was perpetrated.”349 
d.  Comprehensive Family Investigation 
Importantly, a “comprehensive family investigation must be conducted to 
garner a more holistic understanding of how the defendant’s family dynamics may 
have contributed to the capital violence.”350 Specifically, defense counsel should 
investigate “whether there was material discord between the defendant’s parents; 
whether the parents were substance abusers; ‘the relationship of the parents to the 
defendant and other siblings’; whether any family members have a criminal 
history; and whether there has been a history of mental illness in the family.”351 In 
addition—and closely related to family history—counsel should investigate the 
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Embarking on a family investigation is similar to “constructing a series of concentric 
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immediate family. Cessie Alfonso, an experienced mitigation specialist, has argued that 
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beneficial to the defendant’s mitigation case. After methodically investigating the 
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defendant’s educational history, including schools attended, grades achieved, 
attendance records, specific instructors, the occurrence of any psychological 
evaluations, and scholastic awards.352 Finally, in compiling the defendant’s social 
history, “defense counsel must then interview ‘the spreading circles of people and 
institutions that the defendant had contact with during the course of his life.’”353 
This will normally include “friends, neighbors, schoolteachers, clergy, coaches, 
employers, co-workers, physicians or therapists.”354 
Thus, as the above information demonstrates, the areas of investigation and 
discovery of potentially mitigating evidence are substantial. Perhaps most 
critically, however, “[b]ecause capital sentencing requires an all-encompassing 
inquiry into the defendant’s mental health and social life, counsel must ultimately 
turn to the mental health and social work professions for assistance.”355 In fact, 
“[t]hese professions have the necessary experts who can guide attorneys in 
researching and developing relevant mitigating evidence.”356 Commonly referred to 
as “mitigation specialists,” mental health and social work experts are indispensable 
in compiling a persuasive social history for the defendant, and thus should be an 
integral part of every state’s guideline paradigm. 
2.  Mitigation Specialists 
Significantly, while trial counsel may be able to identify all of the necessary 
areas within which mitigating information may be located, counsel often lacks the 
knowledge or resources to locate such substantial amounts of information. As a 
result, “[m]itigation specialists . . . possess the training, experience, and 
wherewithal to bring together the massive amounts of information needed to 
develop a life-saving mitigation strategy.”357  
By definition, mitigation specialists are those “‘qualified by knowledge, skill, 
experience, or training as a mental health or sociology professional to investigate, 
evaluate, and present psychosocial and other mitigating evidence to persuade the 
sentencing authority . . . that a death sentence is an inappropriate punishment.’”358 
Mitigation specialists often have degrees in social work, which enables them “to 
not only hunt down the necessary documentation, but also to offer holistic 
perspectives that can effectively and sympathetically explain why the capital 
violence occurred in the first place.”359 Ultimately, the role of the mitigation 
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 359. Id. at 61.  Importantly, Cooley explains why psychologists and psychiatrists are not well-suited 
to conduct mitigation investigations: 
Psychologists and psychiatrists are highly educated professionals. Nevertheless, their 
training and education, though impressive, does not enable them to perform the 
mitigation specialist’s “intimidating and time consuming task[s].” When psychiatrists or 
psychologists conduct capital evaluations, success often depends on the amount of 
freedom afforded to them to carry out their detailed and time-consuming diagnostic 
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specialist is as follows: 
[T]o provide the attorney with an all inclusive social history of the client, which 
includes identifying significant, positive and negative, traumatic life events . . . 
includ[ing] information on the parental figures in the client’s life . . . [and] the 
social factors that made the client different from siblings and other[s] who may 
have been subjected to the same environment. . . .  Another essential role of the 
mitigation specialist is to assist attorneys in communicating more efficiently with 
the defendant, his or her family members, and other significant mitigation 
witnesses. Similarly, if not more importantly, mitigation specialists are responsible 
for acting as liaisons between other mental health experts (i.e. psychologists [and] 
psychiatrists) and defense counsel.360 
In this way, “[w]hen [properly] utilized, mitigation experts can aid both counsel 
and other mental health experts.”361 
Perhaps most importantly, however, is the assistance that mitigation specialists 
provide to defense counsel in the investigatory or fact-finding process.  Without 
mitigation specialists, defense counsel simply could not—and would not—be able 
to compile the type of social history that would adequately capture the relevant 
aspects of the defendant’s character, background, and personality.362 For example, 
in compiling a life-saving social history, mitigation specialists routinely investigate 
the following avenues: 
• Maternity and birth records (seeking information relating to fetal alcohol 
syndrome, head trauma at birth, or prenatal drug addiction); 
• School records (seeking early psychological or psychiatric evaluations); 
• Other agency records (i.e., foster care systems or public health agencies); 
• Military records (revealing information such as education, psychological 
evaluations, disciplinary actions, work assignments and addiction problems); 
• Family medical records (revealing medical and psychiatric disorders and 
possibly physical or sexual abuse); 
• Criminal and prison records (a clean criminal record may be a mitigating 
factor, while post-incarceration behavior is admissible at sentencing, and thus 
must be known to defense counsel); 
• Employment history (revealing work-related injuries, work assignments, 
duties, awards, and any disciplinary actions); 
                                                                                                     
assessments. Therefore, one major distinction would be having to travel to distant and 
far-off localities to gather documentation and to interview innumerable witnesses. 
Moreover, assembling the necessary documents requires expertise in locating and 
acquiring social service, mental health, education, employment, military, and medical 
documents. Psychiatrists and psychologists, for the most part, are not familiar with the 
various means by which these documents can be legally acquired from governmental 
agencies or private corporations.  Furthermore, many psychiatrists and psychologists 
have pre-existing time constraints arising from non-death penalty related commitments . 
. . . This is not to say, however, that psychologists and psychiatrists should not be 
utilized in capital defense litigation . . . . Their employment, nonetheless, should focus 
on interpretational (e.g., whether the defendant’s psychological testing indicates a 
particular mental abnormality) rather than retrieval or investigative assignments.  
Id. at 62-63. 
 360. Cooley, supra note 9,  at 61. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. at 63-65. 
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• Psychological testing (revealing abnormally low IQ so that death cannot even 
be a consideration); and 
• Evidence of drug and alcohol abuse (revealing a possible diminished capacity 
defense or mitigating premeditation).363 
Stated simply, “[t]he amount of information that is uncovered during 
mitigation investigations is literally beyond measure.”364  Ultimately, “[a]ttorneys . 
. . simply lack the investigative tenacity to perform this potentially limitless 
investigation [and] . . . [m]itigation specialists . . . can utilize their specialized 
training . . . to construct humanizing and sympathetic portrayals of the 
defendant.”365 When defense counsel “employ mitigation specialists they are 
reinforcing the cardinal rule in capital defense work—to save the defendant’s life, 
it takes a team effort.”366 Thus, because “[a]n increasing number of state and 
federal appellate courts have held defense counsel ineffective because they failed to 
meticulously investigate their client’s background to uncover mitigating 
evidence,”367 the use of mitigation specialists will be an important part of any 
guideline system. 
B.  An Active Trial Court That Is Designed to Ensure Compliance with the 
Guidelines and Empowered to Issue Corrective Measures 
Importantly, an active trial court is essential to the proper administration of this 
proposal. The trial court shall serve three primary functions:  (1) to ensure 
compliance with the Commission’s guidelines with respect to the search for 
potentially mitigating evidence (the “investigatory” phase); (2) to ensure that 
counsel’s presentation of relevant mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury 
comports with reasonable levels of professional competence (the “performance” 
phase); and (3) to issue corrective measures where instances of potential 
incompetence or substandard performance are identified, at either the investigative 
or performance phases. 
1.  The Investigative Phase 
The trial court’s first obligation will be to ensure compliance with the 
Commission’s relevant guidelines regarding the search for mitigating evidence. As 
an initial matter, the guidelines should require that each attorney’s initial 
investigative efforts consist of a search into four categories pertaining to the 
defendant’s social profile: (1) medical history; (2) psychiatric disabilities or 
psychological conditions; (3) history of drug or alcohol abuse; and (4) family 
history.  The Commission shall also set a specific timetable that these investigative 
efforts be completed at least thirty days prior to the commencement of the penalty 
phase, to ensure that, if the court deems such efforts insufficient or incomplete, 
corrective measures can be undertaken without prejudice to the defendant. 
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Importantly, after defense counsel completes each set of the investigative 
process within the four categories, he must certify to the court, upon completion of 
each category, that a full and thorough search for all relevant mitigating evidence 
has been completed. In rendering such certification, defense counsel must state the 
specific types of documents and records that were searched under each category in 
an attempt to uncover mitigating evidence.  Furthermore, in completing this more 
specific aspect of the certification, the court will require defense counsel to furnish 
information concerning the mitigation specialists who were enlisted to assist in 
compiling the necessary records under the specified category.  
Critically, due to the substantial amount of information that is likely to be 
uncovered, and the variety of sources from which it may be derived, the 
investigative efforts by defense counsel alone will not be deemed sufficient, and 
should be automatic grounds for an order directing counsel to re-commence 
investigative efforts for that category.  Put another way, the court should expect, 
and counsel should anticipate, that the search for mitigation evidence will entail the 
retention of outside experts with specific expertise in certain areas relevant to 
particular aspects of the defendant’s social history. 
The guideline or checklist approach will allow counsel to waive or forego an 
investigation into one or more of the categories if such investigation, in counsel’s 
judgment, is deemed futile or tactically unnecessary. If counsel makes this 
determination, he will have to certify to the court, in writing and with a detailed 
explanation, precisely why any investigation into the specified category would be 
futile, stating the reason with specificity.  In addition, if such investigation is 
justified with reference to “tactics” or “strategy,” an explanation justifying such 
decision will likewise be required. 
Ultimately, defense counsel’s compliance with the investigative phase 
 will be based upon a certification to the court first identifying the investigative 
efforts for a particular category, for example, medical history, which will be 
followed by a more detailed explanation of the sources that were searched, and 
evidence that was obtained in the course of counsel’s investigation, which shall be 
conducted in conjunction with the efforts of a mitigation specialist that is enlisted 
to aid in such efforts. As stated above, if counsel decides to waive or forego 
investigation into a particular category or source, it shall furnish an explanation 
accompanying the certification explaining the reasons for such a decision. 
The court shall then examine the quality and thoroughness of the investigation 
for each category, to ensure that its breadth and scope is sufficiently likely to 
identify mitigating evidence relevant to the issue of the defendant’s culpability. The 
court will also be responsible for reviewing the substantive explanations for any 
waivers that counsel asserts on the defendant’s behalf, and assessing whether the 
reasons for such a decision is based upon a prudent assessment of the law and facts. 
Ultimately, if the trial court is not satisfied with the scope or direction of defense 
counsel’s investigation, it shall have the power to issue an order directing that 
counsel’s investigation into particular categories or sources resume, and the court 
shall also have the power to order counsel to obtain supplemental professional 
assistance to aid counsel where it deems necessary and just. The purpose of 
creating a more active trial court is both to ensure defense counsel’s accountability 
and to also prevent Sixth Amendment violations before they might otherwise occur. 
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2.  The Performance Phase 
Significantly, the search for and retention of powerful mitigating evidence will 
serve little purpose unless it is presented to the sentencing jury in a compelling 
manner that portrays the defendant’s background, character, and personal history in 
the most sympathetic light possible. For this reason, in addition to having oversight 
concerning the investigatory aspect of the penalty phase, the trial court shall also 
have an active role with respect to trial counsel’s preparation of and presentation to 
the jury of the various mitigating evidence that has been compiled.  
In this way, the trial court will be responsible for actively overseeing the 
manner and method by which defense counsel proffers mitigating evidence before 
the sentencing jury to ensure that, at the very least, counsel is doing so in a manner 
that is consistent with reasonable standards of professional competence.  Of course, 
the trial court shall be admonished never to engage in subjective judgments or 
intrusive comments regarding trial counsel’s strategy or tactics. Instead, the trial 
court will have the power to identify potential situations of incompetent 
representation as it arises, so that corrective measures can be undertaken.  
At the conclusion of trial, if the court is satisfied with the investigatory and 
performance aspects of counsel’s representation, then the court shall certify in 
writing that, in its view, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights have been 
preserved. Importantly, however, in certifying that counsel’s performance is 
consonant both with Sixth Amendment strictures and prevailing professional 
norms, the court shall explain in detail precisely why it arrived at this conclusion, 
with reference to both the particular facts of each case and the law upon which its 
decision is predicated. In doing so, the trial court will create a more specific record 
upon which the appellate court can conduct a meaningful and substantive review. 
This system is designed to promote several objectives. First, it is intended to 
improve the quality of representation of capital defendants during that phase of the 
trial when their lives are at stake. Second, it is designed to hold defense counsel 
responsible and accountable for incompetent representation. Third, it prevents trial 
courts from sitting idly by when counsel completely fails to responsibly exercise 
their duty to advocate on behalf of their clients, a duty that is no more important 
than when a jury is deciding between life and death. Finally, it simply seeks to 
promote a more just and fair society. The representation of capital defendants that 
the post-Strickland world has allowed has been truly offensive. The time for 
change is now. 
C.  The Appellate Review Process: Elimination of Strickland’s Prejudice Prong in 
Favor of a Presumption-Based Reasonableness Analysis 
This Article proposes that Strickland’s prejudice prong be eliminated368 in 
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favor of a presumption-based “reasonableness” analysis that is predicated upon: (1) 
the correctness of the trial court’s certification regarding counsel’s investigation 
and performance at the penalty phase; (2) counsel’s compliance with the relevant 
guidelines governing both investigation and performance; and (3) counsel’s actual 
performance at the penalty phase.369 The occurrence of these steps will 
fundamentally alter the framework for appeals alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
As a threshold matter, it is important to note the precise appellate court, state 
or federal, that will be involved at each stage of the appeals process, because this 
will determine whether the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) are implicated. After a conviction, a defendant will 
normally move for a new trial on several grounds, including ineffective assistance, 
before the same judge that presided over the initial trial. Based upon the proposal 
set forth above, it is virtually guaranteed that the trial court will re-affirm the same 
certification that was made previously approving trial counsel’s performance. The 
defendant, therefore, will almost certainly lose at this phase. 
Subsequently, the defendant will initiate post-conviction proceedings in the 
state courts, which will involve the appellate courts of the state in which the 
defendant was convicted. It is in these proceedings where this Article’s proposed 
appellate review framework (elimination of the “prejudice” requirement in favor a 
presumption-based reasonableness analysis) commences.   
In the event that a defendant claims, in a state post-conviction relief petition, 
that trial counsel was ineffective at the underlying trial, the state appellate review 
process shall occur in the following manner. First, the state appellate court will 
have at its disposal a detailed and comprehensive record by which to assess both 
the decisions of the trial court and the actions of counsel.  Against this backdrop, 
the appellate court’s initial task will be to assess the propriety of the trial court’s 
decision certifying that counsel’s representation was consistent with prevailing 
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professional norms. In making this determination, the appellate court shall first 
review the text of the trial court’s decision regarding certification which, as stated 
above, will explain in depth both the factual and legal underpinnings of its 
decision. The appellate court will then be in a position to assess, whether the 
court’s decision was predicated upon sound factual and legal bases.  
In addition to reviewing the trial court’s decision, the appellate court shall 
review in-depth the certification of trial counsel, which will state with specificity 
the precise categories of information that were searched and the particular sources 
from which mitigating evidence was derived. In examining counsel’s certification, 
the appellate court will be in a position to assess the breadth of counsel’s 
investigation, and determine whether the decision to investigate itself, both in kind 
and degree, was proper based on the relevant facts. In addition, the appellate court 
will also review specific waivers by counsel into certain areas of potentially 
mitigating evidence, and in assessing the propriety of such waivers, be in a position 
to issue meaningful decisions that guide future behavior for trial counsel in capital 
cases. 
After reviewing the trial court’s decision and counsel’s certification, the 
appellate court will also have the opportunity to directly review the record to 
examine the manner and method by which counsel presented defendant’s 
mitigating evidence to the jury. In other words, the appellate court’s role will be to 
ensure that mere technical compliance with the guidelines is not sufficient. Instead, 
counsel must be able to marshal these resources into a compelling story that 
portrays the defendant’s background, character and history in the most 
sympathetic—and truthful—light. This is the essence of effective representation. 
After consulting the trial court’s decision, counsel certifications, the record for 
both errors of commission and omission, if the appellate court believes that the trial 
court’s decision to certify that defense counsel complied with the guidelines, both 
in investigation and actual performance, was proper, then this shall create a 
presumption that counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable as a matter of 
law. This presumption will be predicated both upon the trial court’s oversight role 
and the fact that it possessed the ability to implement corrective measures during 
the penalty phase if it deemed counsel’s mitigation efforts insufficient. Thus, 
should the defendant subsequently allege ineffective assistance of counsel, he will 
be responsible for rebutting this presumption by adducing specific evidence 
demonstrating that counsel’s representation was ineffective.  
However, if based upon its review of the record, the appellate court determines 
that the trial court’s certification decision was erroneous, then there shall exist a 
presumption in favor of the defendant that such representation was ineffective as a 
matter of law, and the burden will be upon the state to adduce evidence that defense 
counsel’s performance was consistent with prevailing professional norms. In other 
words, Strickland’s reasonableness prong will be strengthened substantially under 
this system, and serve as a substantial barrier to defendants seeking to assert 
ineffective assistance claims, as well as to prosecutors seeking to gain a benefit 
from truly substandard representation.  Furthermore, in rendering its decision, the 
appellate court should state with specificity the precise reasons, both with 
references to law and fact, upon which its decision is based. The court should 
particularly emphasize those facts that it found critical to supporting the decision 
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that counsel’s performance was reasonable, and it should explain precisely why 
certain decisions made both in the investigative and performance phases warranted 
a finding of reasonableness. In doing so, the appellate courts can serve an important 
function in providing guidance to both the Commission and future counsel in 
capital cases concerning the standards that will be expected before a determination 
of reasonableness will be justified.  The Commission can then use this data to 
update their guidelines and, as a result, the guidelines themselves can evolve, 
resulting in an overall improvement in the quality of legal representation for all 
criminal defendants.  
It must be noted, however, that this system will undergo some degree of 
change when the defendant exhausts appellate efforts in the state court system and 
commences habeas relief efforts at the federal level. Indeed, once federal habeas 
relief is sought, the provisions of the AEDPA are implicated, which, broadly 
speaking, provide substantially more deference to the trial court’s factual and legal 
determinations. Specifically, under the AEDPA, “[i]n order to grant a capital 
defendant’s request for habeas relief, a federal court must find that the state court’s 
adjudication ‘resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.’”370  
Now, in the current state of federal jurisprudence, it is highly unlikely that the 
courts are going to unilaterally abandon Strickland and suddenly eliminate the 
prejudice prong.  In addition, under the AEDPA, it is not sufficient to “convince a 
federal habeas court that the state court was incorrect in its application of 
Strickland . . . . [Instead] a capital defendant must demonstrate that the state court 
applied Strickland in an objectively unreasonable manner.”371 In other words, “the 
state court’s determination will be sustained if it is ‘at least minimally consistent 
with the facts and circumstances of the case.’”372 
However, the provisions of the AEDPA do not provide any obstacle 
whatsoever to the proposal in this Article because this Article is advocating that the 
law itself needs to be changed, while the AEDPA is merely addressing the level of 
deference to which lower courts are entitled when conducting ineffective assistance 
analysis of the extant law. Also, the AEDPA provides that a federal court can 
overturn a state court decision that is contrary to or involves an unreasonable 
application of clearly established federal law. Thus, when reviewing the decisions 
of state or lower federal courts, appellate courts will likely never overturn a 
decision based upon the “contrary to” language, because courts will almost always 
identify Strickland as the controlling legal standard.  
Critically, however, the AEDPA permits reversal of a state appellate or lower 
federal court decision where it involves an “unreasonable application” of such law, 
and this is precisely the point at which appellate courts exercise the authority to 
engage in meaningful review of the trial court’s decision and counsel’s 
performance. Specifically, if the appellate court believes that the trial court’s 
certification was based upon an improper assessment of counsel’s performance, or 
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that counsel’s investigation was insufficient, then it will have grounds upon which 
to reverse pursuant to the AEDPA’s “unreasonable application” provision. Stated 
simply, while the AEDPA does provide more deference to the state courts’ factual 
and legal findings, it does not give them the authority to act in a manner that is 
inconsistent with either the Sixth Amendment or the most basic principles of 
fairness and due process. This point is no more underscored than the fact that 
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla—the only cases where the Supreme Court has 
ever found ineffective assistance—were decided because the lower court, in the 
majority’s view, “unreasonably applied” Strickland’s two-pronged test.373 In short, 
the AEDPA is not an obstacle to finding that trial counsel acted in a manner 
incongruous with prevailing professional norms. Furthermore, it is not an obstacle 
to normative changes in the law that are based upon sound public policy.  
Indeed, it can be evident under this system that Strickland’s prejudice prong is 
unnecessary and should be eliminated. First, it is nearly impossible and certainly 
impractical to discern whether the incompetent performance of counsel truly 
affected the outcome of a trial. As the Court itself noted in Strickland, the 
“distorting effects of hindsight”374 can surely not provide courts with the sufficient 
context and given circumstances to know how each jury member may have reacted 
to the inclusion of specific mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of a trial. There 
is simply no method by which to know how a juror would react to evidence that he 
has never seen, and to ask a defendant who has been the victim of truly 
incompetent representation to make such a showing is offensive to any notion of 
fundamental fairness. In fact, that is precisely the point—being the victim of 
incompetent representation, particularly when your life is at stake, should be 
enough to warrant a Sixth Amendment violation.  
A defendant should be required to prove no more to a court. Under the 
Constitution, it should be sufficient to say that a defendant, whose life is at stake, 
deserves relief when he has been the victim of truly abysmal representation. 
Whether the outcome was affected should not be relevant, because the process 
matters just as much as the outcome. This system is focused precisely upon a 
process that engenders fairness, a fairness that aspires to improve the quality of 
legal representation, something that the Strickland Court openly said it was not 
seeking to accomplish. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is disconcerting to realize that many criminal defendants have been the 
victims of atrocious representation during capital trials yet have had no success in 
pursuing their claims in the appellate courts and were subsequently executed. That 
system, which resulted largely from Strickland’s nearly impregnable standards, 
needs to change. The criminal justice system should not tolerate for one more day 
attorneys whose performance during the capital trial practically guarantees that a 
defendant will be sentenced to death. Instead, the standards for capital 
representation should continually seek to improve the quality of legal 
representation, not merely establish minimum standards that tolerate sleeping 
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lawyers, lawyers with substance abuse problems, and lawyers whose disciplinary 
problems follow them all the way into the courtroom. This is not justice, and 
Strickland is not justifiable.  
This Article strives to implement lasting change through a simple solution that 
bases itself on the fundamental values of accountability, transparency, and fairness. 
Capital defendants deserve the best representation possible, and if they do not get 
it, courts should provide a remedy regardless of prejudice.  Deprivation of the right 
to counsel in and of itself is an actionable Constitutional violation. However, 
defendants should not have to wait until they are sentenced to death to obtain that 
remedy. The implementation of guidelines and the contemplation of an active trial 
court will ensure that potentially incompetent representation is identified and 
corrected.  Furthermore, if the trial judge ultimately decides erroneously that 
counsel’s performance was competent, then the appellate court will have the 
obligation and responsibility to review the reasonableness of counsel’s 
performance and provide relief where the facts warrant. Under this system, 
procedural fairness is critical to ensuring the overall efficacy of our system of 
representation, which ultimately should provide for a system of representation that 
vindicates the notion of effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 
